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When the State Requires Doctors to Act Against their
Conscience: The Religious Freedom Implications of
the Referral and the Direction Obligations of Health
Practitioners in Victoria and New South Wales
Michael Quinlan*
I urge then, first of all that petitions, prayers, intercessions and
thanksgiving should be offered for everyone, for kings and others
in authority, so that we may be able to live peaceful and quiet
lives with all devotion and propriety. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Most Australian states and territories respect the freedom of
conscience of health practitioners who have a conscientious objection
to abortion. 2 However, Australia’s two most populous states, Victoria

* Professor of Law, Dean, School of Law, Sydney, The University of Notre Dame Australia.
1. 1 Timothy 2:1–2 (New Jerusalem Bible). Unless otherwise specified, all references to
scripture in this Article will be to the New Jerusalem Bible (NJB).
2. Health Act 1993 (ACT) s 84 (Austl.) (“(1) No-one is under a duty (by contract or by
statutory or other legal requirement) to carry out or assist in carrying out an abortion. (2) A
person is entitled to refuse to assist in carrying out an abortion.”); Criminal Law Consolidation
Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(5)–(6) (Austl.) (“Subject to subsection (6), no person is under a duty,
whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate in any
treatment authorised by this section to which he has a conscientious objection, but in any legal
proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection rests on the person claiming to rely
on it. (6) Nothing in subsection (5) affects any duty to participate in treatment which is necessary
to save the life, or to prevent grave injury to the physical or mental health, of a pregnant
woman.”); Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(2) (Austl.) (“No person, hospital, health institution,
other institution or service is under a duty, whether by contract or by statutory or other legal
requirement, to participate in the performance of any abortion.”); see also The Reproductive
Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 6(1)–(4) (Austl.) (“(1) Subject to
subsection (2), no individual has a duty, whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal
requirement, to participate in treatment authorized by section 4 or 5 of this Act if the individual
has a conscientious objection to terminations. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an individual
who has a duty set out in subsection (3) or (4). (3) A medical practitioner has a duty to perform
a termination in an emergency if a termination is necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman
or to prevent her serious physical injury. (4) A nurse or midwife has a duty to assist a medical
practitioner in performing a termination in an emergency if a termination is necessary to save
the life of a pregnant woman or to prevent her serious physical injury.”); Health (Abortion Law
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and New South Wales (NSW), impose restrictions on the freedom of
conscience of health practitioners. In those states, health practitioners
who have a conscientious objection to abortion are obliged to disclose
the existence of their objection to their patient. 3 In Victoria, health
practitioners who object to the procedure are obliged to then refer
patients seeking an abortion to a health practitioner, in the same
discipline, who they know does not share their conscientious
objection. 4 In NSW, medical practitioners who are subject to the
relevant policy are obliged to take every reasonable step to direct
patients seeking that procedure to a health practitioner, in the same
discipline, who the practitioner reasonably believes does not share that
conscientious objection. 5

Reform) Amendment Bill 2016 (Qld.) s 22 (Austl.) (proposed Aug. 17, 2016) (submissions to
close Oct. 6, 2016) (proposing a statutory right, which would not be dependent on religious
beliefs or conscience, to refuse “to perform or assist in performing an abortion”) (“(1) No-one
is under a duty (by contract or by statutory or other legal requirement) to perform or assist in
performing an abortion. (2) A person is entitled to refuse to assist in performing an abortion.
(3) However, a doctor has a duty to perform, and a registered nurse has a duty to assist a doctor
in the performance of, an abortion on a woman in an emergency if the abortion is necessary to
save the life of, or to prevent a serious physical injury to, the woman.”).
3. Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 8 (Austl.); NSW MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
POLICY DIRECTIVE: PREGNANCY–FRAMEWORK FOR TERMINATIONS IN NEW SOUTH WALES
PUBLIC HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS 4.2 (July 2, 2014), http://www.health.nsw.
gov.au/policies/pd/2014/pdf/PD2014_022.pdf. It is not clear that requiring health
practitioners to disclose that they have a conscientious objection to abortion to their patients
rather than, for example, indicating that they have never performed the procedure and do not
provide it, necessarily assists the patients or the health practitioners. Requiring such a specific
disclosure may prompt discussions between a patient and health practitioner as to the nature of
the conscientious objection which would be avoided if such a disclosure were not required. It
may also involve a breach of the health professional’s right to privacy. See also Eva M Kibsgaard
Nordberg, Helge Skirbekk & Morten Magelssen, Conscientious Objection to Referrals for
Abortion: Pragmatic Solution or Threat to Women’s Rights? BMC MED. ETHICS (2014),
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/15/15 (providing some insights of a Norwegian
study of patient attitudes to being informed of their doctor’s conscientious objection to
abortion, finding that some patients considered it a burden to hear different views on abortion
whilst others appreciated that their doctors have their own views and personality including
consideration of the countervailing arguments for and against a disclosure obligation as a
component of a referral or direction provision in relation to conscientious objection to abortion
is beyond the scope of this Article).
4. See Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (Vic) s 5,
(Austl.) (citing the relevant obligations of registered health practitioners, which captures a very
wide range of health workers, whether or not the registration of that person is general, specific,
provisional, interim, or non-practicing).
5. The NSW Policy does not apply to all medical practitioners in NSW. Compliance with
the NSW Policy is mandatory for Area Health Services/Chief Executive Governed Statutory
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This Article examines the religious freedom implications of these
obligations (the “Obligations”). 6 It focuses, in particular, on the
implications for Catholic health practitioners. It does so for two
reasons. Firstly, because Catholics are the single largest religious
denomination in Australia. 7 Secondly, because the Catholic Church
has had a consistent and clear position against abortion with clear,
official teachings on the subject. Part II of this Article describes the
Obligations and their rationale. Part III looks at the religious
composition of Australia and the prevailing attitudes toward abortion
in Australia. Part III also specifically considers the teachings of the

Health Corporations, Board Governed Statutory Health Corporations, Affiliated Health
Organizations—Non-Declared, Affiliated Health Organizations—Declared, and Divisions of
General Practice and Public Hospitals NSW Department of Health. See NSW MINISTRY OF
HEALTH, POLICY DIRECTIVE: NSW HEALTH POLICY DIRECTIVES AND OTHER POLICY
DOCUMENTS, (May 17, 2016), http://www0.health.nsw.gov.au/policies/pd/2016/pdf/
PD2016_014.pdf.
6. This Article considers the Obligations. It does not consider the obligations of health
professionals in emergency cases, where an abortion is necessary to preserve the life of the
pregnant woman. See Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 8(3) (Austl.); NSW MINISTRY OF
HEALTH, supra note 3, at 4.2 (describing such emergencies as “rare”). Whether and when
actions taken in an emergency to preserve the life of a mother are properly characterized as an
abortion or not raises complex questions of direct and indirect intention, consequences and side
effects and the ethical principle of double effect, as well as construction issues in relation to the
expression used in the context of the Abortion Law Reform Act and the NSW Policy. For a
discussion of these issues, see generally, GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL SHAW, FULFILLMENT IN
CHRIST: A SUMMARY OF CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 146 (1991); PATRICK LEE, ABORTION
AND UNBORN HUMAN LIFE 110–20, 124 (2d ed. 2010); Anne O’Rourke, Lachlan De
Crespigny & Amanda Pyman, Abortion and Conscientious Objection: The New Battleground, 38
MONASH U. L. REV. 87, 98–100 (2012). These provisions also raise issues in relation to the
meaning and application in context of the words “preserve the life of the pregnant woman.” If
the situation intended to be covered is indeed “rare,” these words could not be intended to be
construed as broadly as the same words were construed in Rex v Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687,
693–94 (Austl.). The provisions also raise issues as to what constitutes an “emergency” in this
context. See generally Christian Fiala & Joyce H. Arthur, “Dishonourable Disobedience”–Why
Refusal to Treat in Reproduction Healthcare is Not Conscientious Objection, 1 WOMAN–
PSYCHOSOMATIC GYNAECOLOGY & OBSTECTRICS, 12, 14, 20 (2014); Rachael Wong,
Professional Conscientious Objection and Referrals in Medicine (Aug. 10, 2015) (unpublished
LLM dissertation, University of Otago) (on file with author). An examination of emergency
issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
7. According to census data, 27% of the population identified as Catholic in 2001 and
25% of the population did so in 2011. See Cultural Diversity in Australia Reflecting a Nation:
Stories from the 2011 Census, 2012–2013, AUSTL. BUREAU STATSISTICS (Apr. 16, 2013),
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2071.0main+features902012-2013.
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Catholic Church in relation to abortion 8 and the role of conscientious
objection in a pluralist, multi-faith, and multi-ethnic society. Part IV
considers the implications of the Obligations on Catholic health
practitioners and argues that the Obligations operate to deny religious
freedom to Catholic health practitioners who seek to abide by the
official teachings of their Church. Part IV also considers an example
of the operation of the Victorian Abortion Law obligations to
demonstrate their impact, examines the extent of any relevant
protections of religious freedom under Australian law, and considers
whether the Obligations may breach those protections. The Article
concludes that due to the lack of protection of religious freedom for
health practitioners in Victoria and the uncertainty around the level of
protection of religious freedom in NSW, urgent reform is needed to
remove the Obligations.
Before considering the relevant laws of Victoria and NSW, it is
first necessary to note that Australia is a federation of former British
colonies, which is part of the common law tradition. The federation
was established by an act passed by the British Parliament that
contained the Australian Constitution. 9 As a federation of states, each
with its own written constitution, Australia’s legislatures include the
Commonwealth, or Federal Parliament, and state and territory
parliaments. In Australia, whilst the federal government provides
funding for abortion procedures, abortion is primarily governed by
state or territory laws. 10 Over the last few decades all states and
territories in Australia have either enacted legislation to liberalize
access to or to decriminalize abortion, or liberalization of access has
occurred through judicial interpretation and enforcement approaches
to the law. 11 This Article confines its attention to the position in

8. In concentrating on the teachings of the Catholic Church on this topic, this Article is
not seeking to suggest that other faiths do not have teachings on the topic, that the teachings of
the Catholic Church ought be preferenced in some way, that Catholic health professionals may
not have grounds for objection to abortion based on grounds other than their faith, or that there
are not arguments for and against the morality of the intentional termination of pregnancy which
are not founded on Catholic or any other form of religious belief. An examination of the
multiplicity of arguments in relation to abortion is beyond the scope of this Article.
9. Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900 (Imp), 63 & 64 Victoria, c. 12, § 9 (U.K.).
10. NAT’L HEALTH & MED. RES. COUNCIL, AN INFORMATION PAPER ON TERMINATION
OF PREGNANCY IN AUSTRALIA, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 9 [1.2.6] (1996).
11. LOANE SKENE, LAW AND MED. PRACTICE: RIGHTS, DUTIES, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
369–97 §§ 12.1–12.45 (2008) (see especially 398 § 12.1 and 397 §12.45). Since that text was
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Victoria and NSW, as these are the only Australian states that have
modified conscientious objection protections to date. 12
II. THE OBLIGATIONS
A. The Victorian Referral Obligations
As some have argued for the Victorian approach to be adopted
nationally, it warrants particular attention. 13 The Victorian Abortion
Law was passed following a review conducted by the Victorian Law
Reform Commission (the “Review”). 14 Under the Victorian Abortion
Law, a medical practitioner may perform an abortion up until twentyfour weeks gestation at the request of a patient. 15 Abortions may also
be performed after twenty-four weeks if the practitioner reasonably
believes the abortion is appropriate under the circumstances and
consults at least one other registered medical practitioner who shares
that belief. 16 The practitioner is required to consider all relevant
medical circumstances, including the woman’s current and future
physical,
psychological,
and
social
circumstances
(the
“Circumstances”). 17 Similarly, a pharmacist or nurse may administer or

written, abortion laws have been further liberalized with the passing of the Abortion Law Reform
Act 2008 (Vic) (Austl.), in Victoria, the Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013
(Tas) (Austl.), in Tasmania, and the Acts Amendment (Abortion) Act 1998 (WA) (Austl.), in
Western Australia. Whilst some states and territories do seek to override conscience in an
emergency situation, as explained in note 6 above, those situations are beyond the scope of
this Article.
12. Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 8 (Austl.); NSW MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra
note 3, at 4.2; see generally Brigid McKenna, Conscience and the Healthcare Professional, in
FOUNDATIONS OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS: THEORY TO PRACTICE 174, 178 (Jā nis T. Ozolin̦ š &
Joanne Grainger eds., 2015).
13. E.g., Caroline M de Costa & Heather Douglas, Abortion Law in Australia: It’s Time
for National Consistency and Decriminalisation, 203 MED. J. AUSTL. 349, 350 (2015).
14. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, LAW OF ABORTION FINAL REPORT (2008), http:
//www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/VLRC_Abortion_Report.pdf. The Report
followed a request for advice on options for reforming abortion law in Victoria made by the
Attorney General of Victoria in September 2007. This request was made following that
government committing to the decriminalization and modernization of abortion law in Victoria.
Reports of such commissions are not binding on governments but form part of the materials
that governments consider in deciding on whether laws should be reformed and how any such
law reform might best be structured and implemented.
15. Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 s 4.
16. Id. s 5.
17. Id.
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supply drugs to cause an abortion up to twenty-four weeks gestation.18
A medical practitioner may direct a pharmacist or nurse to administer
or supply drugs to cause an abortion in a woman who is more than
twenty-four weeks pregnant if the medical practitioner reasonably
believes that the abortion is appropriate in the Circumstances 19 and
consults at least one other registered medical practitioner who shares
that belief. 20
The Victorian Abortion Law deals with conscientious objection in
the following manner: if a woman requests a health practitioner who
has a conscientious objection to abortion to advise on a proposed
abortion, or to perform, direct, authorize, or supervise her abortion,
the practitioner must inform the woman of his or her conscientious
objection and refer the woman to another registered health
practitioner who the practitioner knows does not have a conscientious
objection to abortion. 21 The Victorian Abortion Law also provides
that, despite any conscientious objection to abortion, a registered
health practitioner is under a duty to perform an abortion in an
emergency. 22 The Victorian Abortion Law has a similar operation in
relation to nurses who have a conscientious objection to abortion.23
Consequentially, the Victorian Abortion Law requires Catholics and
others who have a conscientious objection to abortion to refer their
patients, and thus participate in the procuring of abortions. 24 Should
a health practitioner refuse to disclose and refer, penalties can include
the loss of his or her medical registration. 25 This would prevent a
doctor from practicing anywhere in Australia. 26

18. Id. s 6.
19. Id. s 7(2).
20. Id. s 7(1)(b).
21. Id. s 8(1).
22. Id. s 8(3). As noted, this paper is confined to a consideration of non-emergency
procedures. See supra note 6.
23. Abortion Law Reform Act s 8(4) (providing that, despite any conscientious objection
to abortion, a registered nurse is under a duty to assist a registered medical practitioner in
performing an abortion in an emergency).
24. See supra note 21.
25. Possible outcomes, AUSTL. HEALTH PRACTITIONER REGULATORY AGENCY,
http://www.ahpra.gov.au/Notifications/Find-out-about-the-complaints-process/Possibleoutcomes.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
26. Id.
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B. The Rationale for the Victorian Referral Obligation
Doctors are usually free to decline to perform elective surgical
procedures. 27 The Review specifically recommended the passage of the
Victorian disclosure and referral obligations. 28 The Review also
identified some concerns about the availability of medical staff to
provide abortion services in Victoria, 29 particularly in rural and
regional areas. 30 The Review specifically considered the reasons for this
circumstance. It observed that several factors contributed to the lack
of availability of abortion services in Victoria: the aging of doctors
providing abortion services, 31 the then uncertain legal environment in
relation to abortion in Victoria, 32 the lack of government policies to
ensure access to abortions (said to possibly result from the then
uncertain legal environment in Victoria), 33 the lack of training of the

27. Frank Brennan, Totalitarian abortion law requires conscientious disobedience,
EUREKASTREET.COM.AU (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?
aeid=9155#.V_DJGmVlkXo; see also 250 Medical Practitioners Call For Change, CHRISTINE
CAMPBELL (Nov. 26, 2013) (on file with author) (setting out 4 examples said to have been
provided by Victorian doctors of circumstances, other than in relation to the termination of
pregnancy, in which they had previously exercised conscientious objections, including: refusing
to provide support for the renewal of a driver’s license, refusing to conduct a hysterectomy,
refusing to conduct a female circumcision, and refusing to prescribe or administer drugs). But
see VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at s 8.2, § 8.2 n.1 (2008)
http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/VLRC_Abortion_Report.pdf
(stating
“there is a general expectation that practitioners will provide medical services” despite the fact
that it relied on the Australian Medical Association Code of Ethics, which does not support that
proposition. The footnote reads “The AMA Code of Ethics states a practitioner ‘may decline to
enter into a therapeutic relationship where an alternative health care provider is available, and
the situation is not an emergency.’”) (quoting Code of Ethics (2004), AUSTL. MED. ASS’N, (Nov.
20, 2006), https://ama.com.au/position-statement/ama-code-ethics-2004-editorially-revised2006); Nordberg, Skirbekk & Magelssen, supra note 3, at 6 (noting the necessity for health
practitioners to decline patients’ requests for certain diagnostic procedures, referrals or
inappropriately requested sick leave certificates).
28. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N supra note 14, at 115 recommendation 3 (2008)
http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/VLRC_Abortion_Report.pdf.
29. Id. at 48 §§ 3.104–3.112.
30. Id. at 47–48 §§ 3.100–3.110, 114 § 8.28.
31. Id. at 48 § 3.104 (suggesting that older doctors had first-hand knowledge or
experience of the period before safe, legal abortions became available and saw abortion as an
essential women’s health service).
32. Id. at 48 § 3.06 (note that this was resolved by the amendments to the Victorian
Abortion Law recommended by the Review and discussed above).
33. Id. at 48 § 3.107.
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procedures in some major medical schools 34 and the then restricted
access to non-surgical abortion. 35
In support of its recommendations, the Review referred to a
report of the interplay of conscientious objection and access in rural
and remote areas, which had been conducted in Western Australia. 36
This review did not result in the introduction of any disclosure and
referral obligations in that state. 37 In support of the inclusion of the
referral obligation, the Review referred to a paper, released by the
National Health and Medical Research Council, which specifically did
not endorse recommendations for the inclusion of a referral
obligation. 38 The Review did not refer to any detailed evidence that,
in Victoria, conscientious objection was the cause of, or even a
significant contributor to, any lack of availability of abortion services. 39
It did refer to a Women’s Health Australia submission that referred to
reasons for access problems in rural and regional Victoria. 40 These
reasons included difficulties in attracting medical practitioners to rural
areas and the then indeterminate legal status of abortion in Victoria.41
It also asserted that “women living in rural and regional areas are more
likely to experience anti-choice attitudes by medical practitioners.” 42
The terms of reference for the Review required the Commission
to “ensure the maintenance of current clinical practice standards.”43

34. Id. at 48 § 3.108.
35. Id. at 49–50 §§ 3.113–3.120; see RU 486: the facts, AUSTL. MED. ASS’N VICT,
http://amavic.com.au/page/Member_Services/Publications__Communications/vicdoc/vicd
oc_Features/RU486_the_facts/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2016) (“Although Mifepristone has been
available in Australia since 2006 through the [Therapeutic Goods Administration] Authorised
Prescriber Scheme, its inclusion on the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods (ARTG) [on
August 29, 2015] means that medical termination will now be available to a wider group of
women, including those in regional and rural areas.”).
36. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 114 § 8.28.
37. Id. at 115 n.38; see also Western Australia the Health Act 1911 (WA) (showing that
no disclosure and referral obligations exist in Western Australia).
38. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 115 n.44.
39. Wendy Chavkin, Liddy Leitman & Kate Polin, Conscientious Objection and Refusal to
Provide Reproductive Healthcare: A White Paper Examining Prevalence, Health Consequences,
and Policy Responses, 123 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS S41, S43 (2013) (identifying
the lack of empirical evidence considering this issue).
40. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 47 § 3.102.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 115 § 8.38.
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The Review referred to the Australian Medical Association Code of
Ethics 44 (“the Code”) in support of its recommendation. The Code
“articulates and promotes a body of ethical principles to guide
doctors’ conduct in their relationships with patients, colleagues and
society.” 45 The Code expressly preserves a doctor’s right to decline to
recommend a form of therapy on the grounds of personal moral
judgment or religious belief. In those circumstances, it requires
doctors to inform the patient of their objection. 46 Besides emergency
situations, the Code also recognizes a doctor’s right to decline a
patient relationship or to discontinue a patient relationship where
alternative health care is available, but includes no referral or
direction obligation. 47
Whilst the Review recommended the introduction of a referral
obligation, it made no reference to the fact that abortion was already
widely available in Victoria without the need for a referral 48 and
contained no analysis of the means by which patients access
information about abortion providers. 49 It did not discuss the ready
availability of information about abortion services via the use of
internet search engines, other electronic and print media, or telephone
books. It did not, for example, recommend introducing women to any
additional portals or other sources of information in relation to
abortion providers and services as part of its consideration of the need
to require health professionals with a conscientious objection to
abortion to refer. Yet information about abortion providers is
readily available. 50
44. AMA Code of Ethics, AUSTL. MED. ASS’N (Nov. 20, 2006),
https://ama.com.au/position-statement/ama-code-ethics-2004-editorially-revised-2006.
45. Id. at pmbl.
46. Id. at 1.1(p) (“When a personal moral judgement or religious belief alone prevents
you from recommending some form of therapy, inform your patient so that they may seek
care elsewhere.”).
47. Id. at 1.1(q) (“Recognise that you may decline to enter into a therapeutic relationship
where an alternative health care provider is available, and the situation is not an emergency
one.”); id. at 1.1(r) (“Recognise that you may decline to continue a therapeutic relationship.
Under such circumstances, you can discontinue the relationship only if an alternative health care
provider is available and the situation is not an emergency one. You must inform your patient so
that they may seek care elsewhere.”).
48. McKenna, supra note 12, at 187.
49. Wong, supra note 6, at 58.
50. For example, a Google search of “Where can I get an abortion in Victoria” conducted
by the author on November 3, 2015, produced 51,600,000 hits, including Marie Stopes
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A referral obligation is significant. To a health professional’s
patient, a referral indicates more than a name of a health professional
who might carry out the procedure—it brings with it an expectation
that the professional recommends the health professional to whom the
patient is referred. As one Victorian doctor has observed, “When we
refer a patient to a doctor we accept responsibility for that referral and
we don’t send our patients to doctors whose capabilities are unknown
to us for indeed we can be held professionally liable for
poor referring.” 51
In passing the Victorian Abortion Law, it is evident that the
Parliament intended referrals to be of this type. As Maxine Morand,
Minister for Women’s Affairs, explained during the second reading
speech of the bill in the Victorian Parliament, “The purpose of
requiring the health practitioner to refer the woman to another
comparable registered health practitioner promotes the woman’s right
to make decisions about her own health care, and to receive the
highest attainable standard of health care.” 52
It is evident from the second reading speeches that those
proposing the referral requirement did not appreciate the seriousness
of the difficulties it would present to some health practitioners. The
Minister expressed the requirement in this way:
It is expected that practitioners will, in general, already be aware of
practitioners in their regulated profession who do not have a
conscientious objection to abortion. However, if they do not have
this information, it will be a simple matter for them to consult their

International (http://www.mariestopes.org.au/), Family Planning Victoria (http://www.
fpv.org.au/sexual-health-info/sex-and-the-law/abortion-in-victoria/), The Women’s Clinic
(http://womensclinic.com.au/abortionfaq.php),
Children
By
Choice
(http://www.childrenbychoice.org.au/if-youre-pregnant/im-considering-an-abortion/clinicsinterstate), Fertility Control Clinic (http://fcc.com.au/faq.php), and Pro Choice Action
Network (http://www. prochoiceactionnetwork-canada.org/abortioninfo/bc.shtml).
51. Media Release, Christine Campbell MP, Member for Pascoe Vale, Vict., 250 Medical
Practitioners Call for Change (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.christinecampbell.com.au/mediareleases/250-medical-practitioners-call-for-change/ (quoting Dr. Bruce Shepherd AM, founder
of The Shepherd Centre), http://www.christinecampbell.com.au/media-releases/250medical-practitioners-call-for-change/.
52. Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly 2953–54 (Aug. 19, 2008)
(statement of Maxine Morand, Minister for Women’s Affairs).
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peers before referral, as would commonly be the case in relation to
other kinds of referral. 53

As will be explained in Part III and as McKenna observes, “For
many conscientious objectors, though, the simple act of referral is held
to be morally unacceptable cooperation in the wrongdoing of others;
in this sense, referral renders them complicit in the
objectionable procedure.” 54
C. The NSW Obligations to Direct
In NSW, the Crimes Act 1900 (“Crimes Act”) proscribes
“unlawful” abortion. 55 Whilst that Act has not been legislatively
amended and so continues, on its face, to prohibit the unlawful
procuring of an abortion, the word “unlawful” has been interpreted
by the Courts and subsequently enforced in such a way that abortion

53. Id. at 2953 (emphasis added). It is clear from this speech that Parliament intended
that the referral obligation required a specific referral to a specific health practitioner rather than
what Julian Burnside has referred to as “an uncomplicated effective referral” “to a public hospital
or to a recognised independent pregnancy service.” O’Rourke, De Crespigny & Pyman, supra
note 6, at 108 (quoting Letter from Julian Burnside to Members of the Legislative Council (Oct.
8, 2008) (on file with authors)).
54. McKenna, supra note 12, at 185.
55. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) pt III div 12 (Austl.). The relevant provisions of the Crimes
Act, subdivisions 82 to 84, provide the following:
82 . . . Whosoever, being a woman with child, unlawfully administers to herself any
drug or noxious thing, or unlawfully uses any instrument or other means, with intent
in any such case to procure her miscarriage, shall be liable to imprisonment for
ten years.
83 . . . Whosoever[] unlawfully administers to, or causes to be taken by, any woman,
whether with child or not, any drug or noxious thing, or unlawfully uses any
instrument or other means, with intent in any such case to procure her miscarriage,
shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years.
84 . . . Whosoever unlawfully supplies or procures any drug or noxious thing, or any
instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully
used with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether with child or not,
shall be liable to imprisonment for five years.
Id.
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is readily accessible in NSW. 56 The object of the relevant sections is not
set out expressly in the Crimes Act. 57
The interpretation of the term “unlawful” in this legislation arose
for consideration for the first time in NSW in 1971. In R v Wald, the
NSW District Court ruled that abortion would not be unlawful if a
doctor formed an honest and reasonable belief that there was any
economic, social, or medical reason upon which an abortion was
required to avoid a serious danger to the pregnant woman’s life or her
physical or mental health which existed at the time of consultation or
which could be reasonably be expected to arise during the pregnancy
if not terminated (“the Wald test”). 58

56. See CES v Superclinics Pty Ltd [1995] 38 NSWLR 47, 70 (Austl.); R v Wald [1971]
3 NSWDCR 25 (Austl.); SIMON BRONITT & BERNADETTE MCSHERRY, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 549 § 9.210 (Thompson Reuters 3d ed. 2010) (2001); COMMON GROUND?
SEEKING AN AUSTRALIAN CONSENSUS ON ABORTION AND SEX EDUCATION 15 ¶ 1.2, 17–18 ¶
1.4, 26 ¶ 1.5.3 (John Fleming & Nicholas Tonti-Filippinni eds., 2007) [hereinafter Fleming];
SKENE, supra note 11, at 372–73 § 12.4, 388–89 § 12.24.
57. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 143–44, 145 n.27. The
Commission suggests that the inclusion of the word “unlawful” in the Offences Against the
Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, § 58 (UK), on which the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) was
based, rather than setting out the intended circumstances in which an abortion may be lawful,
“suggests parliament may have meant to delegate the determination of the circumstances in
which abortion is lawful to the judiciary.” VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14,
at 145 n.27. It is at least equally arguable that the word “unlawful” was included as a shorthand
means of referencing the common law exception to the proscriptions on abortion where the
procedure was conducted “in good faith for the purposes only of preserving the life of the
mother.” R v Bourne [1938] 1 K.B. 687 691 (Austl.) (Macnaghten, J). Whilst the direction that
Justice Macnaghten gave to the jury might properly be described as “creative[],” VICTORIAN
LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, § A.15, at 143–44, or as “some judicial, and possibly
judicious, legislation,” Recent Cases-Notes and Comments: Criminal Law-Abortion-For the
Purpose only of Preserving Life 12 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 212 (1938), his earlier statement of the
meaning of the word “unlawful” as used in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 may
well be accurate.
58. Wald 3 NSWDCR at 29. His Honour proposed the following test:
It would be for the jury to decide whether there existed in the case of each woman
any economic, social or medical ground or reason which in their view could constitute
reasonable grounds upon which an accused could honestly and reasonably believe
there would result a serious danger to her physical or mental health . . . . It may be
that an honest belief be held that the woman’s mental health was in serious danger as
at the very time when she was interviewed by a doctor, or that her mental health,
although not then in serious danger, could reasonably be expected to be seriously
endangered at some time during the currency of the pregnancy, if uninterrupted. In
either case such a conscientious belief on reasonable grounds would have to be
negatived before an offence under s 83 of the Act could be proved.
Id.
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Under the Wald test, the relevant danger might arise at any time
during the pregnancy, and, if it did, abortion would apparently be
permissible at any stage of pregnancy. The meaning of “unlawful” in
these provisions arose for consideration again in 1995 in the NSW
Court of Appeal in Superclinics. 59 In this case, Acting Chief Justice
Kirby sought to expand the Wald test. He held that a doctor assessing
the lawfulness of an abortion in NSW could consider the economic
and social circumstances in which the pregnant woman would
probably find herself, not only during but also after the birth, if she
were unable to procure an abortion. 60 Since neither party in the case,
nor the two judges in the case who applied the Wald in its original
form argued for an expansion of the Wald test there is doubt about
the precedential value of the Kirby test. 61
The key judicial decisions in NSW do not refer to any stage of
development of the fetus. Instead, policy directives and other policy
documents have been issued by the NSW Ministry of Health
containing mandatory requirements that apply to a large range of
medical facilities. 62 In July 2014, the Ministry issued the NSW Policy,
which is its most recent policy directive in relation to the termination
of pregnancies. 63 Compliance with the NSW Policy is mandatory and
a condition of subsidy for public health organizations. 64 The NSW
Policy provides for different levels of consultation by the treating
practitioner with other practitioners and specialists depending upon

59. Superclinics 38 NSWLR at 47.
60. Id. at 60.
61. See SKENE, supra note 11, at 396–97 ¶ 12.45.
62. NSW MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra note 5.
63. The 2014 NSW Policy replaced a prior NSW Ministry of Health policy that dealt with
conscientious objection in a manner that did not require individual staff members with a
conscientious objection to provide personal direction. The 2005 policy provided the following:
In the circumstances where staff have a conscientious objection to participate in
terminations of pregnancy or administer any abortifacient agents there is an obligation
to transfer the care of the patient to another medical specialist (or health professional)
on site or at another AHS facility. All staff that have concerns should contact
their manager.
NSW MINISTRY OF HEALTH, PREGNANCY—FRAMEWORK FOR TERMINATIONS IN NEW SOUTH
WALES PUBLIC HEALTH ORGANISATIONS (May 25, 2005), http://www.health.nsw.gov.
au/archive/policies/pd/2005/pdf/PD2005_587.pdf.
64. The 2014 NSW Policy requires all public health organizations which manage facilities
where terminations occur to introduce policies consistent with the NSW Policy. NSW MINISTRY
OF HEALTH, supra note 5, § 1.1.
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the stage of gestation. 65 Whilst there have been no legislative
provisions enacted by the NSW Parliament to remove medical
practitioners’ freedom of conscience rights, the NSW Policy includes
the following disclosure and direction obligations:
Any medical practitioner who is asked to advise a woman about
termination of pregnancy, or perform, direct, authorize or supervise
a termination of pregnancy, and who has a conscientious objection
to termination of pregnancy must:
1. Inform the woman that they have a conscientious objection
and that other practitioners may be prepared to provide the
health service she seeks; and
2. Take every reasonable step to direct the woman to another
health practitioner, in the same profession, who the practitioner
reasonably believes does not have a conscientious objection to
termination of pregnancy.
The term ‘direct’ is to be understood in its ordinary sense, that is, to
direct or point to another source, rather than the requirement of a
written referral as part of an ongoing working relationship. It may
be as simple as directing the woman to another practitioner who they
know has no such objection. This is to ensure that women receive
timely, accurate information from a professional who does not hold
an objection to the health service she seeks.
Any health practitioner having a conscientious objection to
termination of pregnancy should notify their manager in a timely
manner of his/her conscientious objection. Public health
organizations must ensure that no staff member is disadvantaged
because of a conscientious objection to termination of pregnancy.
The exception to this is termination of pregnancy in emergency
situations. Medical practitioners, midwives and nurses must perform
a termination of pregnancy in those rare emergency cases where it is
necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman, regardless of
their objection to abortion. 66

The NSW Policy thus creates an obligation when a request for an
abortion is made to “[t]ake every reasonable step to direct a patient
to another health practitioner, in the same profession, who the

65. Id. § 3.2.
66. Id. ¶ 4.2.
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practitioner reasonably believes does not have a conscientious
objection to termination of pregnancy.”
Whilst the NSW Policy requires the taking of “every reasonable
step” rather than the taking of “every step,” conscientious objectors
should not take any comfort in the inclusion of the word
“reasonable.” Since the NSW Policy is specifically intended to apply
in cases of “conscientious objection to termination of pregnancy,” it
is unlikely that it would be found to be reasonable for a practitioner
to take no such step solely because of a conscientious objection.
Although the NSW Policy does not use the word “referral” and
expressly provides that a written referral is not required to satisfy this
obligation, the requirement to “direct the woman to another health
practitioner, in the same profession, who the practitioner reasonably
believes does not have a conscientious objection to termination of
pregnancy” 67 clearly goes beyond informing the patient “that other
practitioners may be prepared to provide the health service she
seeks,” 68 because that is a separate express obligation. The additional
explanation of the meaning of the word “direct” given by the NSW
Policy suggests that the nature of the “reasonable belief” required is a
high standard—practitioners are expected to direct “the woman to
another practitioner who they know has no such objection” (emphasis
added). Thus, the NSW Policy requires Catholics and others who have
a conscientious objection to abortion to direct their patients to a
practitioner they reasonably believe, or know, has no conscientious
objection. By so requiring, the Policy effectively requires the objecting
physicians to participate in the procuring of abortions. 69
The introduction of this direction obligation into the NSW Policy
was effected by a statutory health corporation: NSW Kids and
Families. 70 Policy documents, such as the NSW Policy, that are not
legislative but mandated and intended to be complied with are often
referred to as “soft law.” 71 However, there is nothing “soft” about the
risk of removing funding and the risk of making a complaint against a
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

NSW MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra note 3, ¶ 4.2.[2].
Id. ¶ 4.2.[1].
See infra Part III.
NSW MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra note 5, ¶ 1.
DENNIS C. PEARCE & ROBERT S. GEDDES, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN
AUSTRALIA 2 ¶ 1.1 (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th ed. 2014); see also Robin Creyke, ‘Soft Law’
and Administrative Law: A New Challenge, 61 AIAL FORUM 15 (2010).
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health professional under the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 72 in
relation to an alleged non-compliance with the NSW Policy. 73 Whilst
the obligation to disclose and direct is currently not legislative, a
Greens member of the NSW Legislative Council introduced the
Abortion Law Reform (Miscellaneous Acts Amendment) Bill 2016
into the Legislative Council on 11 August 2016. If this bill became
law, a medical practitioner with a conscientious objection to abortion
would be required to inform a person seeking information about
abortion of that objection and to refer that person to a local women’s
health center or another health practitioner whom the health
practitioner reasonably believes does not have a conscientious
objection to abortion. 74 A consideration of the potential impact of this
Bill if it becomes law is beyond the scope of this Article. 75
D. The Rationale for the NSW Direction Obligation
The rationale for the amendments to the NSW Policy in July 2014
is not publicly available. In response to an application under the
Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009, 76 the NSW
Ministry of Health produced some materials relating to the decision-

72. A complaint may be made concerning “the professional conduct of a health
practitioner.” Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW) pt 2 div 1 sub-div 7(1)(a) (Austl.).
73. See NSW Health Policy, supra note 5, ¶ 2.1.
74. Abortion Law Reform (Miscellaneous Acts Amendment) Bill 2016 (NSW) sch
1.3 (Austl.).
75. At the time of writing it is not possible to predict the likelihood of this Bill becoming
law and it is beyond the scope of this article to consider whether the form of this legislation
would ameliorate some of the religious liberty concerns of Catholic health professionals in NSW
addressed in this Paper. One of the issues that would require consideration is the extent to which
a local Women’s Health Centre would be likely to refer for abortion services or whether any
such Centres presently or in future may provide such services themselves. Issues in relation to
the need for any such provision would remain. If passed this legislation would apply to all health
professionals in NSW rather than to the more limited class of persons to which the NSW Policy
applies. Health professionals whose religious beliefs prevent them from complying with the
legislation could then no longer opt out of working in organisations within which the NSW
Policy applies.
76. The Honorable Greg Donnelly, a member of the NSW Parliament Legislative Council
(MLC), made this application for “a copy of all the meeting minutes from the relevant
committee/subcommittee/working group etc. that was tasked with the preparation of [the
NSW Policy].” The words of his request are quoted in the response made to it in Letter from
Tim Jap, Senior External Relations Office, NSW Ministry of Health, to The Hon. Greg Donnelly
MLC (June 9, 2015) (on file with author).
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making process. 77 Those materials disclose that a Clinical Ethics
Advisory Panel 78 met, reviewed the NSW Policy on July 5, 2012, 79 and
identified a need to “explore and clarify ‘conscientious objection’” in
the context of conscientious objections by staff to participate in lateterm abortions at various levels of organizations. 80 The materials also
disclose that, on November 6, 2013, a maternal and perinatal health
priority task force meeting involved “significant discussion in regards
to section 4.2 conscientious objection. Further discussion clarified
some key issues.” 81 The materials do not disclose what those “key
issues” were or how they were clarified. The disclosure and direct
obligations contained in the NSW Policy apply to all terminations of
pregnancy and make no reference to late-term abortions.
Given the paucity of explanatory materials, it is not possible to
examine the extent to which, if at all, the issues faced by conscientious
objectors—particularly Catholic conscientious objectors—were taken
into account in the considerations that led to the introduction of the
NSW Policy. The issues discussed in this Article would suggest that
the Panel did not take these issues into account. If the change in policy
was intended to address shortages in staff that are willing to assist in
late-term abortions, the materials do not disclose what options were
considered to address this issue or how the new policy might
ameliorate this issue. It would appear that those involved considered
the objections of conscientious objectors to the referral obligations in
the Victorian Abortion Law to relate to an interpretation of that Act
as requiring a formal written referral rather than a less-formal oral
referral. This may explain the use of the word direct in the NSW Policy
rather than the word refer. However, as noted in Section II.B,
although a written referral is not mandated, the obligation to “direct”
raises essentially the same difficulties for conscientious objectors.
While the NSW Policy asserts that the obligation to direct “may be as

77. Id.
78. The Clinical Ethics Advisory Panel “is a multi-disciplinary panel with expertise in
clinical ethics, clinical practice, consumer concerns, community issues related to health care, law
and philosophy” that provides advice to the NSW Ministry of Health. NSW Health Clinical
Ethics Advisory Panel (CEAP), NSW MINISTRY HEALTH, http://www.health.
nsw.gov.au/clinicalethics/Pages/clinical-ethics-advisory-panel.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2016).
79. Maternal and Perinatal Health Priority Taskforce, Minutes of Meeting (Nov. 5, 2013).
80. Clinics Ethics Advisory Panel, Minutes of Meeting (July 5, 2012).
81. Id.
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simple as directing the woman to another practitioner who they know
has no such objection,” 82, for conscientious objectors, particularly
Catholic medical practitioners seeking to live their faith, this may be
far from simple. 83
III. RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION AND ATTITUDES
A. Religious Background and Attitudes Toward Abortion in Australia
With that background, this Article now considers whether and
how the Obligations might adversely impact those who have a
conscientious objection to abortion pursuant to their religious faith.
Because in Australia, Catholicism is the single largest religious
denomination and the most constant and vocal opponent of
abortion, 84 this Article will consider whether these provisions might
adversely impact Catholic health practitioners. In particular, this
section will consider the religious makeup of Australia by identifying
the proportion of the population that identify as Catholic and
explaining the official position of the Catholic Church in relation
to abortion.
Australia is a pluralist, multi-faith, multi-racial society. 85 The
religious landscape of Australia is a constantly evolving one, but
Australia has deep historical Christian roots. 86 From the first census in
1911, “the majority of Australians have reported an affiliation with a
Christian religion.” 87 Even though this affiliation has been declining
“from 96% in 1911 to 61% in 2011,” the Christian faith traditions
continue to dominate in Australia, with Catholicism being the largest

82. NSW MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra note 3, ¶ 4.2 (emphasis added).
83. See generally McKenna, supra note 12, at 185.
84. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 149 ¶ 8.17.
85. See ROY WILLIAMS, POST-GOD NATION? 114 (2015); Cultural Diversity in Australia
Reflecting a Nation, supra note 7. The varied religious demographics of Australia have also been
recognized by a number of Australian courts. See, e.g., Canterbury Mun Council v Moslem Alawy
Soc’y, LTD (1985) 55 LGRA 318 (Austl.) (discussing public worship in Islam and Christian
religious ceremonies); Christian Youth Camps Ltd. v Cobaw Cmty Health Servs Ltd. [2014]
VSCA 75 at ¶ 560 (Austl.) (Redlich, JA) (emphasizing “the width of activities to which the
religious belief may extend”).
86. A detailed examination of the influence of Christianity is well beyond the scope of this
Paper, but a satisfactory survey can be found in WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 1–141.
87. Cultural Diversity in Australia Reflecting a Nation, supra note 7.
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single religious denomination. 88 Although statistics showing the
religious affiliation of health practitioners in Australia are not available,
if the percentage of Catholic health practitioners replicates the general
trend indicated by the census data, about one-quarter of health
practitioners in Australia have an affiliation to Catholicism.
The European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”) has
observed that maintaining pluralism is dependent on maintaining
freedom of religion. 89 This may explain Australia’s strong tradition of
respecting conscientious objection in Parliament. 90 For example, while
members of the Australian Labor Party are normally required to vote
along party lines, its members of Parliament have the right to vote
according to their conscience in relation to issues such as abortion. 91
Members of Parliament from the other major political party in
Australia, the Liberal Party, are not bound by a caucus vote on any
issue. 92 This support for conscience voting, in relation to abortion
matters, also seems to have majority support. One survey found that
a substantial majority of Victorians support doctors and nurses having

88. Id. From 2001 to 2011, the proportion of the Australian population identifying with
a Christian faith tradition fell “from 68% in 2001 to 61% in 2011,” and this trend was also
evident in the two most commonly reported denominations: Catholicism and Anglicanism. Id.
“In 2001, 27% of the population reported an affiliation to Catholicism. This decreased to 25%
of the population in 2011.” Id.
89. See Eweida v. U.K., App. No. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, at 30 (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115881 (“The pluralism indissociable from a democratic
society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on [religious freedom].”) (last
visited Oct. 5, 2016) (alteration in original).
90. See Fleming, supra note 56, at 9.
91. The Australian Labor Party decided in 1984 that “the matter of abortion can be freely
debated at any state or federal forum of the Australian Labor Party, but any decision reached is
not binding on any member of the Party.” ALP NAT’L CONST. 29 (2015),
https://cdn.australianlabor.com.au/documents/ALP_National_Constitution.pdf.https://d3n
8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/australianlaborparty/pages/121/attachments/original/143995
3357/ALP_National_Platform___Constitution.pdf?1439953357.
92. DEIRDRE MCKEOWN & ROB LUNDIE, INFO. & RES. SERVS., FREE VOTES IN
AUSTRALIAN AND SOME OVERSEAS PARLIAMENTS 8 (2002) (“The Liberal Party does not have
a pledge which binds members to a party line.”); Gerard Henderson, How Menzies would have
dealt with conscience votes is guesswork, SYDNEY INST. (Aug. 22, 2015),
http://thesydneyinstitute.com.au/blog/2015/08/22/how-menzies-would-have-dealt-withconscience-votes-is-guesswork/ (“Liberal Party MPs were given a conscience vote on all pieces
of legislation.”).
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the right to opt out of performing the procedure if they
conscientiously object. 93
Since abortion is readily accessible in Australia, 94 as might be
expected in a pluralist, multi-faith, and multi-racial society, Australians
have a range of views on the issue. 95 As the then Acting Chief Justice
Kirby observed, abortion “is a subject which is prone to engender very
strong feelings.” 96 Some commentators on abortion and conscientious
objection seem to equate legality with right, but, as Margaret
Somerville has explained, “[b]ecause abortion is legal does not mean
that it is right, in the sense of ethically and morally right, in all
circumstances.” 97 Members of the Australian community take
different views; as Acting Chief Justice Kirby has observed:
Some, for reasons of religious instruction or personal conscience,
could not conceive of any circumstances where termination would
be necessary or proportionate. But even in institutions and among
medical practitioners (probably the majority) who do not take this
strict view, variations will occur. 98

Although there is less support for abortion among Australians
with religious belief, the majority of Australians with religious belief
and the majority of Australians overall support the view that a woman
has a right to choose to have an abortion. 99 Some Australians strongly
support abortion at any and all stages of fetal development. 100 Two
large-scale surveys provide reasonable evidence for the view that “no

93. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 115 n.31 (citing AUSTL. FED’N
RIGHT LIFE ASS’N, WHAT AUSTRALIANS REALLY THINK ABOUT ABORTION: A REPORT ON
COMPREHENSIVE INDEPENDENT MARKET RESEARCH 20 (2006)) (“[S]urvey data . . . found
that 62.7% of Victorians ‘support conscientious objection to allow doctors and nurses to
opt out.’”).
94. See AMA supra note 44; Google search results, supra note 50.
95. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 58–68; Fleming, supra note
56, at 48–91.
96. CES v Superclinics PTY LTD (1995) 38 NSWLR 47, 70 (Austl.).
97. MARGARET SOMERVILLE, THE ETHICAL CANARY: SCIENCE, SOCIETY AND THE
HUMAN SPIRIT 31 (2004).
98. Superclinics, 38 NSWLR at 66 (Austl.).
99. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 68; Fleming, supra note 56,
at 53–55.
100. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 67; Fleming, supra note 56,
at 53–55.
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more than 10% of the Australian population oppose
abortion outright.” 101
Whilst “estimates of prevalence [of conscientious objection to
abortion among healthcare providers] are difficult to obtain,”102
Australian health practitioners are also likely to have a wide range of
views on the topic. 103 Surveys taken in the United States and the UK
suggest that conscientious objectors are more likely to self-identify as
religious. 104 According to one random sample taken in the UK, ten
percent of consultant obstetricians and gynecologists would describe
themselves as conscientious objectors, but the majority of that ten
percent would support abortion for severe fetal abnormality. 105 If
Australian doctors have similar views, about ten percent of Australian
health practitioners might be expected to be conscientious objectors
other than in the case of fetal abnormality. In that circumstance, less
than five percent might be expected to have a conscientious objection
to abortion.
There are Australian women who seek termination in the event of
unexpected and unwanted pregnancies and who will seek the services
of doctors who provide that service. There are also Australian women
who would never contemplate an abortion under any circumstances, 106

101. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 67.
102. Chavkin et al., supra note 39, at S43.
103. See Brennan, supra note 27 (“Some doctors think abortion is almost always wrong;
others think it is almost never wrong.”).
104. Chavkin et al., supra note 39, at S44 (citing several survey results, including a random
sample of UK general practitioners, another study of licensed Idaho nurses, and a study of
obstetricians and gynecologists in a New York hospital). Note, however, that a 2012 survey of
medical students found a greater percentage of conscientious objections to be for non-religious
grounds. See McKenna, supra note 12, at 176.
105. Chavkin et al., supra note 39, at S42 (citing Josephine M. Green, Obstetricians’ View
on Prenatal Diagnosis and Termination of Pregnancy: 1980 Compared with 1993, 102 BRIT. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 228, 229 (1995)).
106. The surveys discussed by the Victorian Law Reform Commission produced wide
variation in their results, with 7% (women aged 18–49 years) disagreeing with the proposition
that women should have right to choose whether or not to have an abortion and 32% (men and
women aged 18–34 years) opposing abortion in any circumstances and a smaller proportion of
women than men supporting abortions after 13 and 20 weeks’ gestation. VICTORIAN LAW
REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 65; see also What Women Want: When Faced with an
Unplanned Pregnancy, MARIE STOPES INT’L 13 (Nov. 2006), http://www.
mariestopes.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/DetailedFindingsWhatWomenWant.pdf
(discussing a survey of women who had faced an unwanted pregnancy, finding that 3% believed
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or only in very limited circumstances, and who would be very upset if
their doctors sought to persuade them to terminate their pregnancy.
These women want health practitioners to support their decision to
carry their baby to term whether it is healthy or not, and some want
that support regardless of the impact to their own health. 107
B. The Role of Conscientious Objection in a Multi-Faith, Multi-Racial,
Pluralist Society
This Article now considers the role of conscientious objection in
healthcare in a multi-faith, multi-ethnic, and pluralist society like
Australia. Fiala and Arthur argue that all rights of conscientious
objection should be removed. 108 They describe conscientious
objectors as “anti-choice” 109 and observe that “objectors often see no
moral difference between doing an act and allowing it.” 110 As a result,
they conclude that “[s]ince objectors often view a referral as
equivalent to doing the procedure themselves, limited [conscientious
objection] is inherently contradictory and therefore unworkable.” 111
Instead, they argue for the removal of all rights of conscientious

that an abortion should never be allowed under any circumstance, with 7% saying they did not
know or were unsure of their viewpoint).
107. When O’Rourke et al., argue that women may be deprived of choice if their doctor
“presents information in a way that deprives the patient of choice,” they—without justification—
limit their consideration to doctors who believe that abortion is morally wrong. O’Rourke et al.,
supra note 6, at 116. Wong notes that pregnant women who do not countenance abortion
should have the opportunity to attend a health practitioner who shares their views on this topic.
Wong, supra note 6, at 36; see also Jenny Awford, ‘It hurts my heart’: Bridget Jones Actress Sally
Phillips Whose Son Has Down’s Syndrome Says Pregnant Women Are Being Pressured to Abort
Babies with the Condition, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.dailymail.
co.uk/news/article-3809953/Sally-Phillips-says-pregnant-women-pressured-abort-babies-ssyndrome.html.
108. Fiala & Arthur, supra note 6, at 20. Others have expressed similar views. See Julie D.
Cantor, Conscientious Objection Gone Awry—Restoring Selfless Professionalism in Medicine, 360
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1484, 1485 (2009); Julian Savulescu, Conscientious Objection in Medicine,
332 BMJ 294, 294 (2006); Jay Michaelson, Redefining Religious Liberty: The Covert Campaign
Against Civil Rights, POL. RES. ASSOCIATES 27 (Mar. 2013), http://www.
politicalresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/downlaods/2013/04/PRA_Redefining-religiousLiberty_March 2013_PUBLISH.pdf; see also O’Rourke, et al., supra note 6, at 116–18. But see
McKenna, supra note 12, at 180–83; Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars,
63 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 872–73 (2014); Wong, supra note 6, at 12.
109. Fiala & Arthur, supra note 6, at 13, 17.
110. Id. at 14.
111. Id.
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objection on the basis that healthcare professionals choose their
profession “knowing in advance the full range of duties they will be
expected to perform,” 112 including the provision of abortion.
One flaw in this argument is that in Victoria and NSW, the
Obligations do not apply to health practitioners in only maternity or
gynecology. This approach also presumes that health practitioners
enter their profession knowing that there will be inadequate
protections afforded to their conscience and that their conscience and
religious beliefs remain constant throughout their professional lives.113
Fiala and Arthur assert that those entering the medical profession “are
expected to subordinate their own interests and beliefs in order to
serve others, even those they dislike or disagree with.” 114
At root, arguments of this kind emphasize patient autonomy and
the obligations owed by medical practitioners to society said to arise
from their monopoly position. The arguments expose differences of
opinion regarding the nature of the doctor/patient relationship and a
health professional’s understanding of acting in the best interest of
patients and society. 115 The arguments tend to be limited to views
about mandating the provision of abortion services because few argue
that health practitioners ought to subjugate their own interests
entirely to those of their patients. It is not argued that health
practitioners must, for example, carry out operations or dispense
medications which they consider to be unnecessary or harmful, or that
they provide referrals or directions to any other practitioner who they
know would be willing so to do. Similarly it is not argued that health
practitioner must work for free, visit their patients at home or cancel
their holidays whenever a patient requests that they do so. 116 It was

112. Id. at 15.
113. Conscience, particularly of health practitioners, develops with experience. McKenna,
supra note 12, at 182. The argument also ignores the right to adopt a religion contained in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, art. 18,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
114. Fiala & Arthur, supra note 6, at 15 (citing Bernard M. Dickens, Unethical Protection
of Conscience: Defending the Powerful Against the Weak, 11 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 725,
725–29 (2009)); see also Fiala & Arthur, supra note 6, at 20.
115. See McKenna, supra note 12, at 182–83.
116. See id. at 183–87; Wong, supra note 6, at 31–34; see also Bridget Campion, The Health
Care Professional as Person: The Place of Conscience, 14 CAN. CATH. BIOETHICS INST., no. 2,
Mar. 2016, at 1–4; Paul Litton, Physician Participation in Executions, the Morality of Capital
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not argued that euthanasia services or referrals for the same must be
provided by all health practitioners during the brief period of legalized
euthanasia in the Northern Territory. 117 Nor is it argued that health
practitioners must participate in capital punishment in those U.S.
states where capital punishment is effected by lethal injection. The
interests of the state and the interests of the condemned, being
executed as humanely as possible, are not argued against conscientious
objection in the context of capital punishment. 118

Punishment, and the Practical Implications of Their Relationship, 41 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 333,
340–41 (2013).
117. Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (NTLR) (Austl.). The Rights of the Terminally
Ill Act 1995 commenced operation on July 1, 1996, and operated for nine months before being
overridden by the Commonwealth Parliament by amendments to the Northern Territory (SelfGovernment) Act 1978 (NTR) (Austl.). See Patrick Quirk, Euthanasia in the Commonwealth of
Australia, 13 ISSUES L. & MED. 425 (1998) (providing a history of the legislation and its
operation); Ged Williams, Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation: Practicalities of the Northern
Territory’s Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995, 9 AUSTRALIAN CRITICAL CARE 92, 92–93
(1996); Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill—First Report 2004–05, HL Bill [21] (Gr.
Brit.), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldasdy/86/8602.htm.
Note, that in Canada, a number of recommendations have been made to oblige doctors with a
conscientious objection to euthanasia to act against their conscience by referring their patients
to a doctor who they know does not share their objection. See also, e.g., PROVINCIAL-TERR.
EXPERT ADVISORY GRP., ON PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DYING, FINAL REPORT 43–45 (2015)
(putting Canadian doctors with a conscientious objection to euthanasia in the same position as
health practitioners with a conscientious objection to abortion who are subject to the
obligations); COLL. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS ONT., INTERIM GUIDANCE ON PHYSICIANASSISTED DEATH 4–6 (2015) (this draft document provides interim guidance for the profession
in the absence of a governing framework).
118. In fact, doctors are proscribed from participating in capital punishment by every large
humanitarian and medical organization that has considered the issue, including the American
Medical Association, World Medical Association, General Assembly, American College of
Physicians, American Public Health Association, American Society of Anesthesiologists, and
Physicians for Human Rights. See AMNESTY INT’L, WHEN THE STATE KILLS . . . THE DEATH
PENALTY: A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 77–82 (1989); Daniel J. Cobaugh, Opposing Pharmacists’
Participation in Capital Punishment: The Right Thing to Do, 72 AM. J. HEALTH SYS.
PHARMACISTS 1355, 1355 (2015); Litton, supra note 116, at 335–36; Robert D Truog &
Troyen A. Brennan, Participation of Physicians in Capital Punishment, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1346, 1347 (1993); see also, e.g., the American Medical Association’s opinion on capital
punishment, which contains the following proscription of doctor participation in
capital punishment:
An individual’s opinion on capital punishment is the personal moral decision of the
individual. A physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when
there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a legally authorized execution.
Physician participation in execution is defined generally as actions which would fall
into one or more of the following categories: (1) an action which would directly cause
the death of the condemned; (2) an action which would assist, supervise, or contribute
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If Fiala and Arthur’s view that abortion is “highly ethical,” 119 and
that “a gestational sac or foetus . . . [that] has only the potential to
become a person . . . and [is] not an individual human being” 120 is
correct, their view that all healthcare practitioners should provide
abortion services may be perfectly sound. As has been noted, Australia
is a multi-ethnic, multi-faith, and pluralist society. Whilst many
Australians and many health practitioners may share Fiala and Arthur’s
view on abortion, it is not uniformly held. 121 Some Australians,
including some health practitioners, regard the fetus as an individual
and as a second patient that also has interests to be protected. 122 Some,
including some health practitioners, share the Catholic Church’s view
that abortion is not good for society. 123 This situation is not likely to
change and is a characteristic of a multi-racial, multi-faith, and
pluralist society.
Australian courts have recognized that the relationship between
patient and health professional is an intimate and private one, 124 and

to the ability of another individual to directly cause the death of the condemned; (3)
an action which could automatically cause an execution to be carried out on a
condemned prisoner.
E-2.06 Capital Punishment, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics.page (last updated Aug. 15, 2005) (illustrating
how the interests of the state are not argued against conscientious objection in other contexts).
119. Fiala & Arthur, supra note 6, at 16.
120. Id. at 15.
121. Reporting on the quantitative survey conducted by Sexton Marketing Group in
2004, John Fleming observed that according to that study “[o]nly 42 percent of the
[Australian] community agrees with the proposition that the foetus is not a person.” Fleming,
supra note 56, at 65. The more recent study conducted in Queensland by Galaxy Research
and released in May 2016 found that 55% of all voters in that state believed that abortion
involved the taking of a human life, with that view being most commonly held by women
(56%). See What Queenslanders Really Think About Abortion, ABORTION RETHINK ET AL,
(May
2016), http://abortionrethink.org/images/What_Qlders_Really_Think_About_
Abortion.pdf. See also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 68; Fleming,
supra note 56, at 52–55.
122. McKenna, supra note 12, at 183.
123. Encyclical Letter, Pope Saint John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (Gospel of Life) § 101
(Mar. 25, 1995), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/
hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae.html; see id. §§ 59, 71; see also Encyclical Letter, Pope
Francis, Laudato Si’ §§ 120, 123 (May 24, 2015), http://w2.vatican.va/
content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudatosi.html.
124. Breen v Williams [1996] 186 CLR 71, 107 (Austl.); Rogers v Whittaker [1992] 175
CLR 479 (Austl.).
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are generally loath to interfere with medical judgments made by a
doctor. 125 The intimacy and privacy of the relationship between patient
and doctor may never be more intimate or more private than in the
context of pregnancy, whether planned or unplanned. In a pluralist
society, women ought to be able to seek medical attention from a
variety of medical professionals who are expert and experienced in
providing the medical services sought, and from those who will
support them and provide them with excellent medical attention. 126 It
is therefore important that health practitioners come from a range of
backgrounds and viewpoints, and in the context of abortion this
necessitates the recognition and protection of religious freedom and
conscientious objection. 127 The alternative would be state imposition
of an orthodox position on abortion 128 and the injustice of patients
denied access to doctors who share their views. 129
As the Victorian Abortion Law and the NSW Policy apply not only
to health practitioners working in reproductive health, they pose a real
and present threat to the maintenance of a healthcare system
representing Australia’s multi-racial, multi-faith, and pluralist society.
They discourage Catholics who wish to live by the teachings of their
church and other conscientious objectors from seeking to become and
remain health practitioners in those states.

125. As the TS & DS v Sydney Child Hosp Network court explained,
[I]t is not the role of the court to interfere in such a professional relationship and to
compel action by an unwilling participant which would have the consequence of
placing that individual in the position, in good conscience, of choosing between
compliance with a court order and compliance with their professional obligations.
[2012] NSWSC 1609 ¶ 93 (Austl.).
126. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
127. The argument that all medical professionals involved in the field of reproductive
healthcare must provide all services including those with which they personally disagree, as
advocated by Fiala & Arthur, among others, should be rejected. See, e.g., Fiala & Arthur, supra
note 6, at 20–21. It is, in any event, no answer to the obligations that are not specific to a health
practitioner’s training or area of expertise.
128. Justice Jackson warned against this in W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943), when he said, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein.”
129. Wong, supra note 6, at 36.
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C. The Catholic Church’s Position on Abortion
This Article will now briefly consider the Catholic Church’s
position in relation to abortion 130 to assist readers in understanding
the particular dilemma faced by Catholic health practitioners who seek
to live in accordance with official Catholic teachings. 131
The significance of humanity and the human body is critical to
understanding Catholic theology. 132 In this theology, God created man
and woman in his own image; 133 God became a human being in the

130. I base my description of the Catholic Church’s position on scripture, tradition, and
the magisterium, or official teachings of the Church, for example, CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 81 (U.S. Catholic Conference, Inc.—Libreria Editrice Vaticana trans.,
The Liturgical Press 1994) [hereinafter CCC]. Apostolic Constitution, John Paul II, Fidei
Depositum 3 (Oct 11, 1992), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost
_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_19921011_fidei-depositum.html (describing the CCC
as an accurate compilation of the official teachings of the church).
131. Whilst this paper will limit itself to discussing teachings of the Catholic Church, it is
important to note that in the Catholic intellectual tradition, “there can never be any real
discrepancy between faith and reason.” CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 159 (internal citation omitted).
This means that Catholic health practitioners, like Dr. Mark Hobart, see infra note 170, may
base their conscientious objections to abortion on both faith and reason without any conflict.
As well as considering the interests of the fetus or embryo in addition to the interests of the
woman consulting them, Catholic health practitioners may, for example, place considerable
emphasis on the physical and psychological harm suffered by some women who undergo the
procedure. See, e.g., Wong, supra note 6, at 39–40; Nicholas Tonti-Filipina, Public Policy and
Abortion: Bad but Better Law, in COMMON GROUND?: SEEKING AN AUSTRALIAN CONSENSUS
ON ABORTION & SEX EDUCATION, 350 (John Irving Fleming & Nicholas Tonti-Filipina eds.
2007); ANNE R. LASTMAN, REDEEMING GRIEF 14–19 (2d ed. 2013).
132. The human body is fundamental to God’s plan as revealed in the scriptures. See CCC,
supra note 130, ¶¶ 101, 128–129. God’s plan, at its most basic level, starts with the creation of
the universe and of man and woman, proceeds to God entering the world in the form of a human
person, Jesus Christ, and culminates in the Parousia. See generally SOFIA CAVALLETTI &
PATRICIA COULTER, WAYS TO NURTURE THE RELATIONSHIP WITH GOD (2010); CCC, supra
note 130, ¶ 766. According to Catholic theology, the Parousia is the conclusion of history when
the saved will be raised, body and soul, from the dead. Cf. Revelations 19:5–10, 21:2–3. The
Parousia will be the completion of history when God will grant incorruptible life to our bodies
by reuniting them with our souls. CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 997. “God may be all in all.” 1
Corinthians 15:28. See CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 1001.
133. “God said, ‘Let us make man in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves.’” Genesis
1:26. Likewise, “[the Lord] God shaped man from the soil of the ground and blew the breath
of life into his nostrils, and man became a living being.” Genesis 2:7. Accordingly,
[The Lord] God made the man fall into a deep sleep. And while he was asleep, he
took one of his ribs and closed the flesh up again forthwith. [The Lord] God
fashioned the rib he had taken from the man into a woman, and brought her to
the man.
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person of Jesus Christ, who saved humanity; and, God raises those
saved, body and soul. This means that every human being is vitally
important and deserving of love and respect. 134
According to Catholic theology, as God is love, he is creative. 135
Through procreation, humanity shares in this creative power. 136 If
human life begins at conception, abortion, at any time, would appear
to offend the commandment “You shall not kill.” 137 Whilst there are
no passages in scripture that expressly proscribe abortion, 138 there are

Genesis 2:21–23. Further, “God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he
created him, male and female he created them.” Genesis 1:27–28. According to this view, every
person, male and female, is made in the image of God himself.
134. These passages allow for the inference that, not only is every single person made in
the image of God, but God himself became a human person. When God entered the world, He
could have done so at any time and place and in any way that He chose. His decision to enter
the world in the particular way that he did is significant for Catholics. After first receiving her
consent, God impregnated Mary—a betrothed but unmarried woman—with His son. This
reinforces the view that every individual deserves our love and respect. It also means that, in
Catholic theology, all mothers—married or unmarried—deserve special respect.
135. Father Anthony Percy has described the love between the Father and the Son as “so
intense and real that this love is, in fact, another person—the Holy Spirit.” ANTHONY PERCY,
THEOLOGY OF THE BODY MADE SIMPLE 23 (2006). In Catholic theology, the creative force of
God’s love is seen in the Trinity, in all of creation, and, most importantly, in each person. As St.
Thomas Aquinas put it: “Creatures came into existence when the key of love opened his [God’s]
hand.” CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 293 (internal citation omitted).
136. See Genesis 1:28 (blessing man to “[b]e fruitful, multiply”). He wanted to use love to
bring new human beings into the world and to increase the body of the church. See CCC, supra
note 130, ¶ 1604. As Abad and Fenoy put it: “God has . . . placed in our body the power to
generate, which is a participation in his own creative power.” JAVIER ABAD & EUGENIO FENOY,
MARRIAGE: A PATH TO SANCTITY 46–47 (Sinag-Tala Publishers trans., 2d ed. 2002). For this
reason, God blessed the first married couple, saying to them “[b]e fruitful, multiply, fill the earth
and conquer it.” Genesis 1:28; cf. SCOTT HAHN & KIMBERLY HAHN, ROME SWEET ROME: OUR
JOURNEY TO CATHOLICISM 34–36 (1993).
137. The Gospel according to Matthew records Jesus repeating this commandment:
And now a man came to him and asked, “Master, what good deed must I do to possess
eternal life?” Jesus said to him, “Why do you ask me about what is good? There is one
alone who is good. But if you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments.” He
said, “Which ones?” Jesus replied, “[t]hese: You shall not kill. You shall not commit
adultery. You shall not steal. You shall not give false witness. Honour your father and
your mother. You shall love your neighbour as yourself.
Matthew 19:16–19. This passage has obvious relevance to the abortion issue, but the relevance
depends on the view that is taken of when human life begins.
138. Note that some find such a proscription in Exodus 21:22–25.
If people, when brawling, hurt a pregnant woman and she suffers a miscarriage but
no further harm is done, the person responsible will pay compensation as fixed by the
woman’s master, paying as much as the judges decide. But if further harm is done
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a number of passages in scripture that are relied on that support such
a proscription. 139 For a Catholic, in addition to scripture, tradition
provides guidance on moral issues, as does the Magisterium of church
doctrine—the official teachings of the Catholic Church. Both have
consistently opposed abortion. 140 This prohibition on abortion is set
out in the official teachings of the Catholic Church: the Catechism.141
Not everyone who identifies as Catholic will necessarily know very
much about, have read, or necessarily agree with everything that the
Catechism says. There are, however, many Catholics who accept the
Catechism as a binding and correct statement of the doctrines of
their faith.

however you will award life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot
for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stroke for stroke.
Exodus 21:22–25; see John Paul II, supra note 123, ¶ 61.
139. These passages suggest that human life begins prior to birth. See, e.g., Jeremiah 1:5
(“Before I formed you in the womb I knew you; before you came to birth I consecrated you”);
Luke 1:40–45 (“Now it happened that as soon as Elizabeth heard Mary’s greeting, the child
leapt in her womb and Elizabeth was filled with the Holy Spirit. She gave a loud cry and said,
‘Of all women you are the most blessed, and blessed is the fruit of your womb. Why should I be
honoured with a visit from the mother of my Lord? Look, the moment your greeting reached
my ears, the child in my womb leapt for joy.’”); Psalm 22:9–10 (“It was you who drew me from
the womb and soothed me on my mother’s breast. On you was I cast from my birth, from the
womb I have belonged to you.”); Psalm 139:13 (“You created my inmost self, knit me together
in my mother’s womb. For so many marvels I thank you; a wonder am I, and all your works are
wonders You knew me through and through, my being held no secrets from you, when I was
being formed in secret, textured in the depths of the earth. Your eyes could see my embryo. In
your book all my days were inscribed, every one that was fixed is there.”). Also relevant are those
passages which discuss children as a blessing. See, e.g., Genesis 1:28; James 1:17; John 16:21;
Mark 10:14; Matthew 18:10; Proverbs 17:6; Proverbs 22:6; Psalm 127:1–5.
140. Ivereigh has described the Catholic Church’s position on abortion in this way:
The Church has always opposed abortion, in spite of debate in the early and medieval
Church about when human beings acquired souls (‘ensoulment’). Even in the Middle
Ages, when most Western Christians did not see the early embryo as fully human, it
was believed the human embryo should never be attacked deliberately, however
extreme the circumstances.
This condemnation of abortion was anchored in the Church’s reflection on the
Scripture. In the Old Testament, Exodus and the Psalms, among other books, reveal
a God who knows his creatures even before they are born, and who forms, names,
and loves the child in the womb. At the heart of the Church’s advocacy is this
knowledge of God as the author of our being.
AUSTEN IVEREIGH & JOHN NORTON, HOW TO DEFEND THE FAITH WITHOUT RAISING YOUR
VOICE: CIVIL RESPONSES TO CATHOLIC HOT-BUTTON ISSUES 93 (2012).
141. See John Paul II, supra note 130, at 3.
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The Catechism makes it clear that human life must be respected
and protected from conception 142 and that direct abortion is gravely
immoral. 143 The official teaching of the Catholic Church might be
summarized in this way: every human person is created in the image
of God; 144 God himself became human; 145 human life is vitally
important; 146 having children is a participation in God’s creative
power; 147 human life exists from the moment of conception;148 a
human life in the womb is equally deserving of respect and protection
as a human life outside the womb; 149 it is wrong to take innocent life;150
and, deliberate abortion is intrinsically evil. 151
The Catholic Church distinguishes between ‘formal” and
“material” cooperation in immoral acts. 152 Formal cooperation occurs
when a person makes the immoral action of another person their own
action. For example, a nurse will formally cooperate with an abortion

142. The following two passages support this notion.
Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves the creative action of God
and it remains forever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end.
God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one can under any
circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being.
CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 2258. “Human life must be respected and protected absolutely from
the moment of conception. From the first moment of his existence, a human being must be
recognized as having the rights of a person—among which is the inviolable right of every
innocent being to life.” Id. ¶ 2270.
143. Id. ¶ 2271 (“Since the first century the Church has affirmed the moral evil of every
procured abortion. This teaching has not changed and remains unchangeable. Direct abortion,
that is to say, abortion willed either as an end or a means, is gravely contrary to the moral law:
‘You shall not kill the embryo by abortion and shall not cause the newborn to perish.’”).
144. Id. ¶¶ 355, 369; see also Pope Francis, supra note 123, ¶ 65.
145. CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 423.
146. Id. ¶ 2270; see also Pope Francis, supra 123, ¶ 65.
147. CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 1652; Genesis 1:28.
148. CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 2274.
149. Id. ¶ 2271; see also Pope John Paul II, supra note 123, ¶ 62; Pope Francis, supra note
123, at 136 (“[T]he inalienable worth of a human being transcends his or her degree
of development.”).
150. CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 2273.
151. Id. ¶ 2271. Intrinsically evil acts are “acts which per se and in themselves,
independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object.” John Paul
II, supra note 123, ¶ 80 (internal citation omitted).
152. GRISEZ & SHAW, supra note 6, at 147. Formal cooperation can occur when someone
participates in an abortion—even where they are disgusted by it and disapproving of it—wanting,
even reluctantly, for it to occur.
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where he or she assists in an abortion and intends it to happen. 153
Formal cooperation in an abortion is a grave offence and includes all
those without whose help the abortion would not have taken place. 154
It attracts the most severe ecclesiastical penalty of the Catholic
Church: automatic excommunication. 155 Material cooperation occurs
where a person’s acts do not make the immoral act his or her own but
assist the occurrence of the immoral act. An example might be an
orderly who works in an abortion unit or a nurse who prepares patients
to undergo the procedure. 156 Material cooperation may be immoral
and a person in such a situation may feel morally obliged in conscience
to find another job. 157
The Church asserts that its teaching in relation to abortion seeks
to promote “the most precious and essential goods of society” 158 for
“the true good of the whole of human society.” 159 It teaches that a
civil law permitting abortion is “an intrinsically unjust law,” 160 that it

153. Grisez and Shaw also give the example of an intern who participates in an abortion,
as a requirement of the completion of medical training. Id. at 147–148. The participation is
formal because the intern actually intends the abortion to take place, even if with great
reluctance. Id.
154. See John Paul II, supra note 123, ¶ 62.
155. CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 2272; CODE OF CANON LAW ANNOTATED 1398, 1329.2
(E. Caparros et al. eds, 1993); see John Paul II, supra note 123, ¶ 62. This precludes the
reception of the sacraments (including communion, reconciliation, confirmation, marriage,
anointing of the sick and Holy Orders). It can only be absolved, according to Canon law, by the
Pope, the bishop of the relevant place or by priests with their authority: CCC, supra note 130,
¶ 1463. An example of the operation of the Code of Canon Law in this regard occurred in 2010
where Sister Margaret Mary McBride participated in an ethics committee decision to approve an
abortion resulting in her automatic excommunication from the Catholic Church. See Nun
Excommunicated, Loses Hospital Post Over Decision on Abortion, CATH. REV. (May 18, 2010),
http://www.catholicreview.org/article/life/nun-excommunicated-loses-hospital-post-overdecision-on-abortion#sthash.JKU1UkSv.dpuf. Note that on September 1, 2015 in his Letter of
His Holiness Pope Francis According to Which an Indulgence is Granted to the Faithful on the
Occasion of the Extraordinary Jubilee of Mercy, HOLY SEE (Sept. 1, 2015), http://w2.
vatican.va/content/francesco/en/letters/2015/documents/papa-francesco_20150901_
lettera-indulgenza-giubileo-misericordia.html, Pope Francis announced that “notwithstanding
anything to the contrary, to concede to all priests for the Jubilee Year [8 December 2015 to 20
November 2016] the discretion to absolve of the sin of abortion those who have procured it
and who, with contrite heart, seek forgiveness for it.”
156. GRISEZ & SHAW, supra note 6, at 148.
157. Id.
158. John Paul II, supra note 123, ¶ 101; see also id. ¶¶ 59, 71.
159. Id. ¶ 101; see also Pope Francis, supra note 123, ¶¶ 120, 123.
160. John Paul II, supra note 123, ¶¶ 20, 57, 73.
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is never legitimate to obey it, 161 and that there is “a grave and clear
obligation to oppose [such law] by conscientious objection.”162
Whether a particular Catholic considers complying with the
Obligations to be formal or material cooperation in an abortion which
takes place as a consequence, the actions would be immoral under the
Church’s official teachings. 163
IV RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IMPLICATIONS UNDER AUSTRALIAN LAW
A. Implications for Catholic Health Practitioners in Victoria
and NSW
The Church’s teachings have significant implications for Catholic
health practitioners in NSW and Victoria who accept them. Whether
abortion is lawful or not under domestic law, they consider deliberate
abortion at any stage of gestation as identical to the deliberate killing
of a human being after birth. 164 On this view, for the state to require
such a person to participate in abortion is equivalent to the state
requiring such a person to participate in the murder of an innocent
victim. 165 For such a person, an obligation to refer a patient to a second
health professional who the first health professional knows or
reasonably believes does not object to abortion is equivalent to
requiring that person to refer or direct a parent with a newborn baby
to a health practitioner who has no moral objection to infanticide.166
As Craven has put it, “By compulsorily referring a patient for an
161. Id. at 58 ¶ 73.
162. Id.
163. Id. ¶ 71–73, at 57–58. The fact that abortion is lawful under domestic law, or that
the domestic law obliges participation in some way in abortion, does not mean that, for Catholics
who follow the official teachings of the Church, participating in the abortion is
morally permissible.
164. Id. ¶ 60–61, at 48–49.
165. See Laycock, supra note 108, at 878.
166. Whilst it might be argued that such as obligation to refer is remote from the procedure
itself, referring or directing a patient to a health professional who has reasonable grounds to
believe, or knows to have no conscientious objection, to carrying out a termination appears to
be a much closer or greater participation in the ultimate act. It is greater than the funding of
health care insurance, where a proportion of that insurance would potentially fund the
acquisition of contraceptives (including contraceptives with a potentially abortifacient effect).
Such insurance funding may or may not ever be utilized by staff of the type considered by the
United States Supreme Court in the Hobby Lobby decision in relation to the Obamacare
contraceptive mandate. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

1268

4.QUINLAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1237

12/14/2016 3:24 PM

When the State Requires Doctors to Act Against Their Conscience

abortion, an objecting medical practitioner necessarily makes him or
herself complicit in an action they regard as ethically and
morally impossible.” 167
Obliging a Catholic health practitioner to make such a referral or
direction requires that practitioner to defy the teachings of his or her
faith. 168 Like laws that seek to impose an obligation of disclosure of
the contents of a confession on a Catholic priest, laws requiring
referral or direction by a Catholic health practitioner who seeks to live
by the dictates of his or her faith are likely to be futile because they
seek to impose an obligation that cannot be followed. 169
Whilst evidence is not available to confirm that Catholic health
practitioners in Victoria or NSW have failed to comply with the
Obligations, the Norwegian experience suggests that this is likely to
occur. 170 In that country, a referral from a GP171 was required for an
abortion to take place and GPs had no legal right of conscientious
objection. One GP who participated in a study undertaken in Norway
explained that he refused to refer patients for terminations, despite his
legal obligations to do so, because “My conscience is not a dress that
I can put on or take off whenever I want to. My conscience must be
there all the time, as a ballast, for me to remain a whole
human being.” 172
The study refers to a number of doctors speaking of the moral
value of unborn human life and some who speak of the value of human

167. Greg Craven, Denying people right to conscience akin to fascism, AGE, (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/denying-people-right-to-conscience-akin-tofascism/2008/09/25/1222217428407.html.http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/de
nying-people-right-to-conscience-akin-to-fascism/2008/09/25/1222217428407.html.
168. See Pope John Paul II, supra note 123, at 16 ¶ 20, 48–49 ¶¶ 60–61, 57–59 ¶¶ 71-73.
169. Fiala & Arthur supra note 6, at 14; see Seward Reese, Confidential Communications
to the Clergy 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 81 (1963); R v. Gruenke, [1991] S.C.R. 263, 303–04 (Can.);
Cook v. Carroll [1945] I.R. 515, 518 (Ir.).
170. Dr. Hobart is a GP working in a doctors’ surgery (which is the name used in Australia
for the offices that a GP occupies rather than a term used to describe premises where medical
surgery occurs) in the suburb of Sunshine in Melbourne, Victoria. Andrew Smith, Doctor refused
to refer couple for sex-selective abortion: faces possible loss of his license, LIFESITENEWS, (Oct. 08,
2013),
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/abortionist-refused-to-refer-couple-for-sexselective-abortion-now-faces-lo.
171. A GP is a qualified practicing medical practitioner who is a “General Practitioner”
rather than a specialist practicing in a single area of medicine.
172. Nordberg, Skirbekk & Magelssen supra note 3, at 4.
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life from conception. 173 It describes this comment as representative:
“Human life is something very special, and we humans are not granted
the option of taking a life.” 174 The study quotes another GP who said
that “I want to contribute to improving people’s lives, and to helping,
soothing and comforting. Then it becomes self-contradictory to
take lives.” 175
The Norwegian study found that “[s]everal [doctors] described
an inability to refer for abortions. If referrals had been demanded of
them, these informants stated, they would not have been able to carry
on as GPs.” 176 This has been the experience in Victoria where the
Victorian Abortion Law has caused some health practitioners to cease
to practice and others to move out of particular areas of practice. 177
The Victorian Abortion Law and the NSW Policy, of course,
assume that not all health practitioners will refuse to obey, will retire,
or will cease to practice in areas more likely to attract abortion
inquiries or requests. Some health practitioners will, no doubt, obey
the Obligations and refer or direct. This does not justify the
Obligations. There is growing evidence that requiring health
practitioners to act against their consciences can lead to physical and
mental symptoms known as ‘moral distress’ or ‘moral injury’. 178 Two
of the GPs, who participated in the Norwegian study and provided a
referral for abortion, contrary to their professed inability to do so,
described their feelings of bad conscience and guilt. One said that “[i]t
felt like contributing to murder, in addition to breaking my
own principles.” 179
Moral distress involves feelings of helplessness, anxiety, anger,
guilt, sorrow, and frustration. It can have adverse effects on self-

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
McKenna, supra note 12, at 187 (referencing NICHOLAS TONTI-FILIPPINI, ABOUT
BIOETHICS: MOTHERHOOD, EMBODIED CULTURE AND LOVE (2013)). As the Obligations are
not limited to health practitioners working in maternity or gynecology there is no guarantee that
moving out of the areas in which woman are more likely to consult a doctor about terminations
would protect doctors from the Victorian Abortion Law or the NSW Policy. See Smith, supra
note 170. Dr. Hobart, the subject of the case study presented below, is a GP.
178. McKenna, supra note 12, at 179, Sean Murphy & Stephen J. Genius, Freedom of
Conscience in Health Care: Distinctions and Limits, 347 BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 10, 350 (2013).
179. Nordberg, Skirbekk & Magelssen, supra note 3, at 4.
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respect, self-esteem, patient care and job satisfaction. 180 It can cause
burnout, and contribute to health practitioners leaving their
vocation. 181 Some studies indicate that moral distress is most likely to
affect nurses (and one might extrapolate from these studies to apply
to other health practitioners) whose ethical beliefs are most influenced
by their religious faith. 182
Health practitioners who consistently act against their conscience
can also become desensitized to it. They are at greater risk of
developing indifference to patients and “doubling” or
“compartmentalization,” leading to a weakened ability to make the
types of ethical decisions critical for health practitioners. 183
Hence, the Obligations put a Catholic health practitioner seeking
to live by the teachings of their Church in an impossible position. To
refer or to direct is to defy Church teachings and face
excommunication, moral distress, and potentially loss of his or her
moral compass. To fail to refer or direct is to risk disciplinary action
and the potential loss of the right to practice medicine. It is much like
seeking to compel a Catholic priest to testify as to the content of a
confession in defiance of the teachings of his Church 184, or seeking to
compel a politician to vote against his or her conscience. 185 The
Obligations are also not imposed by Australia’s other states and
territories. As Laycock and Berg have observed:

180. Murphy & Genius supra note 178, at 350; Marek S. Kopacz , Kelsey V. Simons &
Khamkay Chitaphong, Moral Injury: An Emerging Clinical Construct with Implications for
Social Work Education, 34 J. RELIGION & SPIRITUALITY SOC. WORK: SOC. THOUGHT 252, 254
(2015); Kent D. Drescher et al., An Exploration of the Viability and Usefulness of the Construct
of Moral Injury in War Veterans 17 TRAUMATOLOGY 8, 9 (2011); Shira Maguen & Brett Litz,
Moral Injury in the Context of War, PTSD: NAT’L CTR. PTSD, http://www.
ptsd.va.gov/professional/co-occurring/moral_injury_at_war.asp.
181. McKenna, supra note 12, at 179; Wong, supra note 6, at 24–27.
182. McKenna, supra note 12, at 176.
183. Id. at 180–81; Wong supra note 6, at 24–27; MICHAEL BURLEIGH, DEATH AND
DELIVERANCE: ‘EUTHANASIA’ IN GERMANY, C. 1900–1945 154 (1994).
184. CCC, supra note 130, ¶ 1467; Reese, supra note 169, at 60–61; Gruenke, S.C.R.
263 at 303–04. Victorian and NSW law do not require this. See A. KEITH THOMPSON,
RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE AT COMMON LAW: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 220 (2006),
http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/358/2/02Whole.pdf. This is not to suggest that
futility is the only reason for the protection of religious confession privilege as there are a number
of justifications for that protection. See Reese, supra note 169, at 80–87.
185. See Victoria, supra note 52, at 2959. As noted, the major political parties in Australia
do not require this.
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[C]ommitted religious believers argue that some aspects of human
identity are so fundamental that they should be left to each
individual, free of all nonessential regulation, even when manifested
in conduct. For religious believers, the conduct at issue is to live and
act consistently with the demands made by the Being that they
believe made us all and holds the whole world together. 186
No religious believer can change his understanding of divine
command by any act of will . . . Religious beliefs can change over
time. . .But these things do not change because government says
they must, or because the individual decides they should . . . [T]he
religious believer cannot change God’s mind. 187

B. A Case Study: Dr. Mark Hobart
The case of Dr. Mark Hobart is an example of the operation of the
Victorian Abortion Law. Dr. Hobart is a Catholic, pro-life GP and a
former activist in the Democratic Labour Party. 188 In a statement
submitted in relation to a Victorian inquiry in 2011, Dr. Hobart said
that “[t]o say [abortion] is not murder is against direct observation,
reason and logic.” 189 His public statements suggest that his opposition
to abortion was based both on his Catholic faith and on reason. Dr.
Hobart was reportedly approached by a couple who wished to obtain
the termination of a 19-week pregnancy because they were pregnant
with a girl when they wanted a boy. 190 Whilst the Victorian Abortion
186. Douglas Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, Protecting Same-Sex Marriage and Religious
Liberty, 99 VA. L. REV 1, 3–4 (2013).
187. Id. at 4.
188. A political party which emerged following a split in the Australian Labor Party (ALP)
in 1955 in which, a group of members of the ALP who were avowedly anti-communist and
almost exclusively Catholic, were expelled from that party. It is an anti-abortion party. One of
its party’s principles is: “the sacredness of human life, from conception until natural death, as
the fundamental basis for all human rights.” Principles: Articles 11-12 of the DLP Constitution,
DEMOCRATIC LAB. PARTY (Sep. 29, 2016, 7:03 PM), http://www.dlp.org.
au/about/principles/.
189. Tory Shepherd, Dr. Mark Hobart, who refused couple abortion for wanting a boy,
believes abortion is murder, ADELAIDENOW (April 29, 2013), http://www.news.
com.au/national/dr-mark-hobart-who-refused-couple-abortion-for-wanting-a-boy-believesabortion-is-murder/story-fncynjr2-1226631861565. See discussion above on the relationship
between faith and reason in the Catholic intellectual tradition.
190. This is the usual bias in sex-selection terminations that normally target female fetuses.
Michael Garenne & Sophie Hohmann, Gender Saturation in the Southern Caucasus: Family
Composition and Sex-Selective Abortion, 46 J. BIOSOCIAL SCI. 786, 787 (2014). Sex-selection
abortions are controversial, the ethics of the practice have been questioned, in some jurisdictions

1272

4.QUINLAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1237

12/14/2016 3:24 PM

When the State Requires Doctors to Act Against Their Conscience

Law obliged Dr. Hobart to refer the couple to a doctor willing to
perform the procedure, he refused. The couple obtained a termination
elsewhere and made no complaint. 191
In April 2013, Dr. Hobart disclosed to the Melbourne newspaper,
Herald Sun, that he had refused to refer a couple seeking an abortion
on gender-selection grounds. Although there had been no patient
complaint192 and there was no evidence of the patient having any
difficulty locating health practitioners to carry out the termination,
the Medical Board of Victoria (MBV) launched an investigation.
Three weeks after his comments appeared in the paper, Dr. Hobart
received a letter from the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation
Agency (AHPRA) advising him that the MBV had initiated an inquiry
into his “professional conduct, following receipt of information that
indicates [he] may have . . . failed in [his] obligation to refer a female
patient seeking treatment or advice on abortion to a nonobjecting practitioner.” 193
Another doctor was also reportedly cautioned by the MBV in
2013, following adverse comments he made about the referral
provisions of the Victorian Abortion Law “in an online ‘conversation’
with colleagues.” 194 The results of these investigations have not been
made public. 195 In neither case does the behavior of these doctors

there have been demands for health practitioners who engage in the practice to be disciplined
and it “can be seen as contrary to fundamental principles of human rights.” Jean V McHale, Sex
Selection and Abortion: A Case for Legal Re-valuation? 21 BRIT. J. NURSING 308, 309 (2012).
AUSTRALIAN GOV’T NAT’L HEALTH & MED. RES. COUNCIL, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of
Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research, 11.1 (2007),
https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/_files_nhmrc/publications/attachments/e78.pdf provides that
“[s]ex selection is an ethically controversial issue. The Australian Health Ethics Committee
believes that admission to life should not be conditional upon a child being a particular sex.
Therefore, pending further community discussion, sex selection (by whatever means) must not
be undertaken except to reduce the risk of transmission of a serious genetic condition.” Whilst
this guideline is currently under review and applies to Assisted Reproductive Technology rather
than to abortion, where sex selection is not currently prohibited, it demonstrates the ethical
challenges presented by sex selection. The fact that the MBV would investigate a GP in such a
case shows the strength of its opposition to conscientious objection of abortion.
191. Smith, supra note 170.
192. Id.
193. Terri M. Kelleher, VICTORIA: Melbourne GP may be struck off after refusing abortion
referral, NEWS WKLY. (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.newsweekly.com.au/article.php?id=56391.
194. Id.
195. Although, one report refers to Dr. Hobart as being “sanction[ed].” Australian
Christian Lobby, Victorian Premier and Opposition Leader Pledge to Allow Conscience Vote on

1273

4.QUINLAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/14/2016 3:24 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

suggest that patients were deprived of access to medical services.
Neither case involved any patient complaint. These examples suggest
that, rather than operating to ensure access to abortion services, the
referral obligation has been used to discipline doctors who speak out
in opposition to the lack of protection given to their conscientious
objection to abortion. Health practitioners under investigation, and
their families, face financial and emotional harm. In addition to the
financial consequences of obtaining legal advice and representation,
there must be a substantial strain on individuals and their families
when faced with potentially losing the ability to continue to practice
in their chosen profession. Even if the disciplinary action is successfully
defended or not pursued to the stage of deregistration as a medical
practitioner, “[i]n many respects, ‘the process is the punishment.’” 196
C. Protections for Religious Freedom Under Australian Law
This Article now considers the religious freedom implications of
the Obligations under Australian law. Although there is no case law in
Australia that has considered the issue of abortion and conscientious
objection, Australian courts have made numerous statements
recognizing the importance of religious freedom. It has been
described as “the paradigm freedom of conscience,” 197 “the essence of
a free society,” 198 “a fundamental concern to the people of
Australia,” 199 a “fundamental freedom,” 200 and “a fundamental right
because our society tolerates pluralism and diversity and because of the
value of religion to a person whose faith is a central tenet of their

Forcing Doctors to Participate in Abortion, CONSCIENCELAWS.ORG (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://consciencelaws.org/blog/?p=6029.
196. This phrase is taken from Augusto Zimmermann, Joshua Forrester & Lorraine Finlay,
Section 18C may render all speech “inoffensive,” NEWS WKLY. (Mar. 26, 2016),
http://newsweekly.com.au/article.php?id=57247. In this article, the authors make this
argument about Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act (Cth), which they assert
improperly limits freedom of speech. The same argument might be made in respect of the
Obligations where, after investigation, the health practitioner is not deregistered or
otherwise disciplined.
197. Church of the New Faith v Comm’r of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) [1983] 154 CLR 120, 130
(Austl.); Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement Inc v S Austl. [1995] 64 SASR 551, 557 (Austl.).
198. Church of the New Faith, 154 CLR at 130 (Austl.).
199. Canterbury Mun Council v Moslem Alawy Soc’y Ltd [1985] 55 LGRA 318,
335 (Austl.).
200. Aboriginal Legal Rights, 64 SASR at 552, 555 (Austl.).
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identity.” 201 Australian courts have recognized “the importance of the
freedom of people to adhere to the religion of their choice and the
beliefs of their choice and to manifest their religion or beliefs in
worship, observance, practice and teaching.” 202 Despite these
statements, apart from specific legislation that protects religious
freedom in limited areas, 203 little substantive legislative support exists
for religious freedom in most circumstances.
1. Section 116
One substantive support is Section 116 of the Australian
Constitution, which contains a proscription on the Commonwealth
establishing a state religion or imposing any religious test for the
holding of any Commonwealth office. It also prevents the

201. Christian Youth Camps Ltd v Cobaw Cmty Health Servs Ltd [2014] VSCA 75, ¶
558 (Austl.).
202. Evans v NSW [2008] 168 FCR 576, 580 (Austl.).
203. For example, although voting is compulsory in Australia if an elector has a religious
belief that it is “his or her religious duty to abstain from voting,” this will constitute a reasonable
excuse under Section 245(14) of the Electoral Act and Section 45(13A) of the Referendum Act.
Electoral Backgrounder: Compulsory Voting, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMM’N ¶ 41 (Sept. 12,
2014),
http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/backgrounders/compulsory-vo
ting.htm. Members of the clergy of any church or any religious denomination are also “entitled
to refuse to divulge that a religious confession was made, or the contents of a religious confession
made” to them in NSW and Victoria. Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 127(1); Evidence Act 2008
(Vic) s 127(1). This protects the religious beliefs of clergy and of those who confess to them.
Victorian equal opportunity legislation exempts actions which would otherwise be unlawful
discrimination “if the discrimination is reasonable necessary for the first person to comply with
the doctrines, beliefs or principles of their religion.” Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) pt 5 s 84.
The religious beliefs of ministers of religion are protected as they have no obligation to
“solemnise any marriage,” and they are free to impose additional requirements on couples
wishing to be married by them. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) pt 4 div 2 s 47. Exemptions are also
provided to religious bodies from a range of discrimination provisions to enable them to operate
schools, to provide accommodation, and to comply with their own doctrines in managing their
own operations. Whilst these provisions are focused on the religious bodies operating these
institutions, in doing so they facilitate choice by religious believers and others who may choose,
for example, to attend or for their children to attend a religious school or to enter a religious
order. Examples of protections for religious bodies include, for example, Sex Discrimination Act
1984 (Cth) pt 2 div 4 ss 37 & 38; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) pt 3 div 3 s 31A(3)(a),
pt 3A div 3 s 38K(3), pt 4C div 3 s 49ZO(3), pt 6 s 56; Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) pt 4
div 3 s 39, pt 4 div 5 s 60, pt 5 s 82 & 83(1)–(2). For a summary of the exemptions from various
discrimination provisions that are afforded to religious (and other) schools in Australia, see GREG
WALSH, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND DISCRIMINATION LAW 1–11 (2015). Note however that
there have been some recent amendments to the Victorian position following the passing of the
Equal Opportunity Amendment (Religious Exceptions) Act 2016 on September 15, 2016.
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Commonwealth from prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 204 Only
a few cases have considered this section. 205 However, it is not relevant
to the present inquiry on the present state of the law. As the
Obligations are state laws or policies rather than Commonwealth laws,
Section 116 has no application to them. 206
2. International agreements
There are a number of potentially relevant international
agreements to which Australia is a party. For example, Article 18 of
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.” Similarly, Article 18 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 207 which Australia

204. Section 116 of the Australian Constitution provides that “[t]he Commonwealth shall
not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a
qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.”
205. See Williams v Commonwealth [2012] 248 CLR 156 (Austl.); Church of the New Faith
v Comm’r of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) [1983] 154 CLR 120 (Austl.); A-G for Vic v Commonwealth
[1981] 146 CLR 559, 605 (Austl.); Adelaide Co of Jehovah’s Witnesses v Commonwealth [1943]
67 CLR 116 Austl.); Krygger v Williams [1912] 15 CLR 366 (Austl.); Hoxton Park Residents
Action Grp Inc v Liverpool City Council [2016] NSWCA 157 (Austl.); see also Paul Babie &
Neville Rochow, Feels Like Déjà Vu: An Australian Bill of Rights and Religious Freedom, 2010
BYU L. REV. 821, 829–32; Denise Meyerson, The Protection of Religious Rights Under
Australian Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 529, 538–40, http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu
/lawreview/vol2010/iss3/8.
206. A-G, 146 CLR at 605; Grace Bible Church v Reedman [1984] 36 SASR 376, 386
(Austl.). Since those decisions, the High Court of Australia has identified an implied right of
political communication under Sections 7 and 24 of the Australian Constitution, and that
implied right applies not only to the Commonwealth government but also to state and territory
governments. See Austl Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1992] 177 CLR 106, 137–
46 (Austl.) (Mason CJ) (the restrictions of the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution
as being a fetter to the Commonwealth government but not to state governments may be an
issue appropriately open to challenge before the High Court of Australia in the future); id. at
217 (Gaudron J); id. at 227–33 (McHugh J); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills [1992] 177 CLR
1, 69–74 (Austl.). This argument was not put by the self-represented defendant in the most
recent decision on the application of Section 116 within states. Williams v ‘Threewisemonkeys’
[2015] TASADT 4 (Austl.).
207. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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has been a party to since 1980, 208 provides potentially relevant
protections. 209 Australia requires international obligations to be
enacted into domestic law before they have domestic operation.210
Whilst, under Article 2 of the ICCPR, Australia undertook to respect
and ensure that everyone within Australia and subject to Australian
jurisdiction recognizes the rights in the ICCPR, the articles of the
ICCPR have not been domesticated. As a result, they do not have the
force of law in Australia. 211 The same is true of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other potentially relevant
international instruments. 212 As they have not been domesticated, they
are not binding in Australia.
3. Victoria
In Victoria, Section 14 of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights
and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the “Charter”) 213 provides that
“[e]very person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
religion and belief.” 214 However, this provision cannot have any
208. George Williams, The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities:
Origins and Scope, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 880, 895 (2006).
209.
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
ICCPR, supra note 207, at art. 18(1)–(4).
210. Victoria v Commonwealth [1996] 187 CLR 416, 469 (Austl.); Minister of State of
Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] 183 CLR 273, 288 (Austl.); Chow Hung Ching v
The King [1948] 77 CLR 449, 455 (Austl.).
211. Dietrich v The Queen [1992] 177 CLR 292, 347 (Austl.).
212. Such as, G.A. Res. 36/55, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter
Religion Declaration].
213. Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) pt 2 s 14(1)–(2); see
Babie & Rochow, supra note 205, at 840–42, for a summary of the operation of the Charter.
214. Charter of Human Rights, supra note 213, at pt 2 s 18.
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operation in relation to the referral obligation contained in the
Victorian Abortion Law because the so-called “savings provision,”
Section 48 of the Charter, provides that “[n]othing in this Charter
affects any law applicable to abortion or child destruction.” 215 The
Human Rights Consultation Committee (the “Committee”)— which
recommended the introduction of the Charter in Victoria— was
concerned that, given the great passions the Committee had identified
within the Victorian community for and against abortion, if it included
the “right to life” within the rights afforded protection by the Charter,
the Charter may have divided rather than unified Victorians. 216
George Williams, who chaired the Committee, has described the
inclusion of Section 48 in the Charter as “[a]n even better solution”217
to the Committee’s proposal that the Charter include a provision
expressly limiting the Charter’s protection of the “right to life” “to a
person from the time of his or her birth.” 218 Section 48 was introduced
to enable the Charter to include a “right to life” without impacting
the abortion debate. 219 The provision “ensures that when other rights
in the Victorian Charter of Rights, such as that of privacy, might
impact upon the abortion debate, they are incapable of doing so.” 220
The inclusion of Section 48 denies health professionals any access to
the Charter as a means of arguing for the protection of their religious
freedom, in the context of abortion law and practice. Those adversely

215. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 14, at 162 D.4–D.6. Absent Section
48, the obligations imposed on health professionals with a conscientious objection to abortion
to inform their patient of their objection might also potentially have attracted the operation of
the privacy and reputation provisions contained in Section 13(a) of the Charter, which provides
that a person has the right “not to have his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence
unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with.”
216. Williams, supra note 208, at 895–96.
217. Id. at 896.
218. Draft Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities, recommended by the
Committee, § 8(2).
219. According to the then Victorian Attorney-General, Rob Hulls, the “Savings Clause”
was introduced at the request of the Catholic Church, as it was concerned that the Victorian
Court might take the approach to abortion which had been taken by the Canadian Supreme
Court in applying the Canadian Charter of Rights in R v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30
(Can.). The width of the operation of Section 48 and its application to religious liberty freedom
of conscience and privacy in future abortion law reform was not then contemplated. See
discussion in O’Rourke et al., supra note 6, at 102–03.
220. Williams, supra note 208, at 896. See also the discussion in VICTORIAN LAW REFORM
COMM’N, supra note 14, at 162 (D.4)–(D.6), 171 (D.91).
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impacted by the referral obligations contained in the Victorian
Abortion Law may feel that their rights to religious freedom have been
sacrificed to avoid “dividing Victorians around a set of
human rights.” 221
The common law also provides no solution to the lack of relevant
statutory protection for religious freedom in Victoria because it has
never included a fundamental guarantee of religious freedom and
expression that could not be abrogated by state parliaments. 222 Whilst
the principle of legality requires a court seeking to infringe rights or
overturn fundamental principles to do so with “irresistible
clearness,” 223 the Victorian Abortion Law does recognize and
expressly seek to qualify freedom of conscience. 224 Although the
Victorian Abortion Act does not specifically refer to the right to
freedom of religion in the disclosure and referral provisions, the
reference to freedom of conscience in the Victorian Abortion Law is
sufficient to incorporate the right to freedom of religion. 225 And even
though international law is not part of the common law, it can
influence the common law. 226 Where, for example, legislation is
ambiguous, Australian courts should favor a construction that is
consistent with Australia’s obligations at international law. 227Again,
however, this provides no assistance in relation to the Victorian referral
obligations as the provision is not lacking in clarity.

221. Williams, supra note 208, at 896.
222. See Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v NSW [2001] 205 CLR 399, 403 (Austl.); Aboriginal
Legal Rights Movement Inc v S Austl [1995] 64 SASR 551, 555–57 (Austl.); Grace Bible Church
v Reedman [1984] 36 SASR 376, 385 (Austl.); Garth Blake, God, Caesar and Human Rights:
Freedom of Religion in Australia in the 21st Century, 31 AUSTL. B. REV. 279, 294–95 (2009);
Meyerson, supra note 205, at 540–41; Neil Foster, Keynote Address at the 2015 Asia Pacific J.
Reuben Clark Law Society Conference: Religious Freedom in Australia 17–20 (May 29, 2015),
http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster/94.
223. Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (Austl.) (quoting SIR PETER BENSON
MAXWELL & J. ANWYL THEOBOLD, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 122 (4th
ed. 1905)).
224. Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) pt 2 s 7–8.
225. Freedom of religion has been recognized in Australia as forming a part of the freedom
of conscience. Chief Justice Mason of the High Court of Australia and Justice Brennan described
it as “the paradigm freedom of conscience” in Church of the New Faith, 154 C.L.R. at 130.
226. Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] [1992] 175 CLR 1 (Austl.); Chow Hung Ching [1948]
77 CLR at 449 (Austl.); Jago v District Ct. of N.S.W. [1989] 168 CLR 23 (Austl.).
227. Teoh 183 CLR at 287 (Austl.); see PEARCE & GEDDES, supra note 71, at 102–
05, 229–30.
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4. New South Wales
Like Victoria, NSW has no relevant legislative protections for
religious freedom that could provide grounds to challenge the NSW
Policy. 228 Whilst current law indicates that, so long as they do so clearly
and unambiguously, state parliaments can exclude the operation of the
common law protections for freedom of conscience and freedom of
religion, the NSW Policy is not a law. It is “soft law”—a non-legislative
policy. 229 No matter how clearly it is drafted, a policy may not have the
effect of ousting common law protections. However, the abortion
issue is untested. In practice, the issue may not arise, as a complaint
concerning the “professional conduct of a health practitioner,” such
as non-compliance by a health practitioner with the NSW Policy, may
be made under the Health Care Complaints Act 1993. 230
In interpreting the very broad language of that Act, in the context
of an alleged non-compliance with the NSW Policy, a court will apply
the principle of legality mentioned above. The Health Care
Complaints Act 1993 does not include any language indicating an
intention to override the common law freedom of conscience or
freedom of religion. Applying this principle, a court is not likely to
find that the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 abrogates common
law rights of freedom of conscience or religion. However, the content
and extent of any such common law protection is unclear. 231
In addition to common law freedoms, the court will seek to
interpret and apply the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 where there

228. In some situations, the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977—which forbids
discrimination in certain specified areas on the ground of “race,” but defines “race” in Section
4 as including “ethnic origin” and “ethno-religious” origin—could be relevant where
discrimination is alleged to have occurred against an ethnically identifiable religious group in the
areas designated. See NEIL REES ET AL., AUSTRALIAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: TEXTS,
CASES AND MATERIALS 192–94 (1st ed. 2008). The provisions of the NSW Anti-Discrimination
Act are not relevant in this instance as we are not considering its application in the context of an
“ethno-religious” or race-based group. As a result, in relation to the policy’s operation on
Catholic health professionals, the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 would not apply to
prevent the operation of the policy.
229. See supra note 71 (discussing the meaning of “soft law”).
230. Pursuant to Section 7 of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993, a complaint may be
made concerning the “professional conduct of a health practitioner.” Health Care Complaints
Act 1933 (NSW) s 7 (Austl.).
231. REX ADHAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 130 (2d
ed. 2013).
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is any ambiguity and to the extent that its language will permit in
conformity with international law. 232 Although it is by no means
certain that this would be the case, there is some support for the view
that, relating to abortion, a court could appropriately interpret the Act
by reference to the ICCPR. 233 If that approach were followed, the
court would be required to consider whether the disclosure and direct
obligations go beyond the limitation permitted by Article 18. 234 In
doing so, the court could consider relevant decisions of the United
Nations Human Rights Committee applying the ICCPR and of the
ECHR applying Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”), 235
which contain essentially the same terms. 236 For this reason the
relevant decisions of the ECHR are briefly considered below.
In the ECHR, many cases involving claims of religious freedom
by service providers and employees have failed where the court has
found that applicants would be free to manifest their beliefs if they
resigned and sought work elsewhere or that, whilst they were required
to act inconsistently with their religious beliefs by the law they were
still able to manifest their religious beliefs outside their professional

232. See Lim v Minister for Immigration, Land Gov’t and Ethnic Affairs [1992] 176 CLR
1, 38 (Austl.); Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’ Ass’n [1908] 6 CLR 309, 363
(Austl.); Teoh 183 CLR at 287 (Austl.); PEARCE & GEDDES, supra note 71, at 102–05, 229–30.
This does not mean that the Court can ignore the words used in the Australian legislation and
substitute its own words that are consistent with international law but inconsistent with the
Australian law being considered.
233. DPP v Kaba [2014] VSC 52, 181, 187 (Austl.).
234. In other words, the court must consider whether the obligations are “prescribed by
law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others.” ICCPR, supra note 207, at art. 18.
235. Article 9 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9 § 1, Sept.
3, 1953, ETS No. 005.
236. Iliafi v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints Austl. [2014] FCAFC 26 (Austl.).
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activities. 237 In the case of Pichon, for example, the court held that
Article 9 does not “always guarantee the right to behave in public in
a manner governed by [religious] belief” because “[t]he word
‘practice’ used in Article 9 § 1 does not denote each and every act or
form of behaviour motivated or inspired by a religion or a belief.”238
On this basis, Article 9 did not provide any relief from the conviction
of the sole pharmacists in a French town from breaching French law
by refusing to supply legal non-abortifacient contraceptives because of
their religious beliefs. 239 The Court did not consider whether the
contraceptives could readily have been purchased from pharmacies in
nearby towns. 240 It also failed to consider the full ramifications of the
decision. For example, one potential consequence is that the
pharmacists, unable to act inconsistently with their religious objection
to contraception, would close their pharmacy, leaving no pharmacy in
the town.
This approach to the interpretation of the word “practice” in
Article 9 § 1 was subsequently followed in R.R. v. Poland. 241 This case
involved delay and obfuscation by doctors and hospital staff in the
provision of diagnostic services to a pregnant woman concerned about
237. Decisions made on the basis that the applicant would be free to manifest their beliefs
if they resigned and sought work elsewhere include, for example, Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur.
Ct. H.R. 173; Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 126, ¶ 15 (1981); Kalac v. Turkey,
App. No. 20704/92, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 552 (1997); Stedman v. United Kingdom, App. No.
29107/95, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 168 (1997); Konttinen v. Finland, App. No. 24949/94, 87 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (ser. A) at 68 (1996); Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90,
74 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993); X. v. Denmark, App. No. 7374/76, 5 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 157 (1976); Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98 (2010).
Decisions made on the basis that the applicant would be free to manifest their religious beliefs
outside of their profession include, for example, Pichon v. France, 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 383.
238. Pichon, 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 388.
239. Id. The Court found that:
as long as the sale of contraceptives is legal and occurs on medical prescription
nowhere other than in a pharmacy, the applicants cannot give precedence to their
religious beliefs and impose them on others as justification for their refusal to sell such
products, since they can manifest those beliefs in many ways outside the
professional sphere.
Id.
240. This is in contrast with the same court’s rejection of a complaint by an ultra-orthodox
Jewish association arguing that Article 9 was offended by a law which prevented them from
establishing a slaughter-house in accordance with Jewish law on the basis that they could easily
obtain meat slaughtered in accordance with Jewish law from Belgium. Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek
v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 23.
241. R.R. v. Poland, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 209, 253.
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fetal abnormality who had expressed an intention to obtain an
abortion if her fears were confirmed. 242 The applicant argued that
“[r]efusing to diagnose a potentially serious illness [of an embryo] on
the basis that the diagnosis might subsequently lead to a therapeutic
act to which the doctor concerned objected on grounds of conscience
[i.e., an abortion] was incompatible with the very concept of
conscientious objection.” 243
Referring to Pichon, the court reiterated “that the word ‘practice’
used in Article 9 § 1 does not denote each and every act or form of
behaviour motivated or inspired by a religion or a belief.” 244 In this
case, the court confirmed that the ECHR afforded states a wide
margin of appreciation or latitude in how to legislate in the area of
abortion. 245 The court confirmed its earlier finding that once a State
adopts a legal framework allowing abortion in some situations, “the
State is under a positive obligation to create a procedural framework
enabling a pregnant woman to exercise her right of access to lawful
abortion.” 246 Though this requirement does not mean that a State
cannot protect freedom of conscience, according to the court:
States are obliged to organise the health services system in such a
way as to ensure that an effective exercise of the freedom of
conscience of health professionals in the professional context does
not prevent patients from obtaining access to service to which they
are entitled under the applicable legislation. 247

The approach to freedom of religion in these cases has been
criticized. 248 In Eweida, the court was unwilling to take the view that

242. Id. at 216–20.
243. Id. at 243.
244. Id. at 253 (citing Pichon, 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 383).
245. Id. at 247. The European Court of Human Rights did so recognizing the inextricable
interconnection between the rights claimed on behalf of a fetus and a mother. Id.
246. Id. at 251.
247. Id. at 253.
248. E.g., R v. Sec’y of State for Educ. and Emp’t [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 246
(HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); Copsey v. WWB Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA (Civ) 932,
[2005] ICR 1789 ¶¶ 35–36 (Eng.). In Copsey, Lord Justice Mummery indicated that he would
have found there to have been a material interference in the applicant’s Article 9 rights were it
not for the European Commission of Human Rights rulings which had found that a person’s
religious freedom had not been interfered with in his or her employment given their ability to
change jobs. See also id. ¶¶ 60–62 (Rix, L.J.).
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Convention rights would not be breached where an applicant could
leave a job in order to exercise those rights. 249 The court held:
[T]hat, where an individual complains of a restriction of freedom of
religion in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility of
changing job [sic] would negate any interference with the right, the
better approach would be to weigh that possibility in the overall
balance when considering whether or not the restriction
was proportionate. 250

In the court’s view, it was required to ask whether a “fair balance
[had been] struck between the competing interests of the individual
and of the community as a whole, subject . . . to the margin of
appreciation enjoyed by the State.” 251 Applying this approach, the
court found that the United Kingdom was in breach of Article 9 by
failing to sufficiently protect the ability of a woman to manifest her
Christian faith by wearing a cross visibly around her neck. 252 The court
weighed Ms. Eweida’s fundamental right to manifest her religion
against her employer’s desire to maintain its corporate image. It found
that her religious freedom prevailed in the circumstances “where there
is no evidence of any real encroachment on the interests of
others . . . .” 253 The court also considered a number of other claims of
breaches of Article 9 and found that Article 9 had not been breached
in those instances because the interests of others might have been
affected by the manifestations of religious belief by those applicants in
the workplace. 254
249. Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215.
250. Id. at 32.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 35.
253. Id.
254. The court accepted that the actions of the three other claimants were manifestations
of their religious belief and that Article 9 was engaged. Id. at 36, 37, 39. These claims were
made by a nurse who also wished to wear a cross on a necklace; a civil servant who refused to be
designated as a registrar of civil partnerships because she had a religious objection to participating
in the creation of same-sex civil partnerships; and a counselor who, due to orthodox Christian
beliefs on marriage and sexual relationships, refused to provide psycho-sexual counseling to
same-sex couples. When undertaking the balancing exercise in relation to the three other
applicants, the court nevertheless found that freedom of religion was outweighed. The
outweighing factor for the nurse was a Department of Health uniform policy that prohibited the
wearing of necklaces “to reduce the risk of injury when handling patients.” Id. at 36. The court
accepted that there was a risk of injury to the nurse and to patients, and that preventing this risk
was “necessary” and sufficient to enliven the limitations permitted by Article 9 § 2. Id. at 37.
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Given these authorities, even if international law were found to be
applicable in considering the NSW Policy, it is by no means certain
that a court would find that a medical practitioner who refused to
comply with the direction obligations of the NSW Policy would be
protected from disciplinary action or dismissal. The cases indicate that
the facts will be critical. Assuming a hypothetical case of a Catholic
doctor who, following disciplinary action for refusing to give a patient
a direction as required by the NSW Policy, has had his or her right to
practice medicine in Australia revoked, and given the Catholic
Church’s teaching in relation to abortion explained above, it seems
likely that such a doctor would be able to establish that a refusal to
direct a patient in accordance with the NSW Policy was a
“manifestation” of his or her religious belief. 255
Assuming a NSW Court applied this approach in considering
Article 18 of the ICCPR, the issue for the Court would be whether
the NSW Policy is “necessary to protect public safety, order, health,
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”256
Applying Eweida, this would involve the court in balancing the health
professional’s right to freedom of religion against other rights such as
the right of women to obtain access to lawful abortions in NSW. 257 If,
for example, without a direction from the Catholic doctor, the woman
was immediately able to access another health practitioner’s assistance
and obtain the procedure—particularly in the same facility—the court
may be persuaded to find for the health practitioner.
V. CONCLUSION
Australians have a range of differing views on abortion. This is why
Australia’s major political parties have always given parliamentarians a
conscience vote on abortion legislation. It is why Australia’s other
Although the court noted that the civil servant had been employed when civil partnerships did
not exist, it found that the legitimate aim of providing legal recognition and protection of
different-sex couples outweighed the civil servant’s right to religious liberty. Id. at 38. The same
balancing considerations resulted in the ECHR finding that there was no violation of Article 9
when the psycho-therapist lost his job due to his non-compliance with a policy of his employer
that required all staff to provide counseling in relation to marriage and sexual relationships
whatever the patient’s sexual orientation. Id. at 39.
255. Id. at 31 (interpreted by the Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal in Christian
Youth Camps Ltd. [2014] VSCA at ¶ 434 (Neave JA) (Austl.); see also Vartic v. Romania (No.
2), 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1296).
256. ICCPR, supra note 207, at art. 18.
257. Eweida, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 47–48.
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states and territories specifically protect health practitioners who have
a conscientious objection to abortion. The Obligations unnecessarily
put Catholic health practitioners seeking to follow their church’s
teachings in an impossible position. To comply is to defy Church
teaching. Doing so risks excommunication, moral distress, and a loss
of moral compass. Refusing to comply risks disciplinary action and the
potential loss of the right to practice medicine. This would be much
like seeking to compel a Catholic priest to testify as to the content of
a confession in defiance of the teachings of his Church or seeking to
compel a politician to vote against his or her conscience. We do not
do that in Australia. It is not reasonable for a state to seek to override
an individual’s religious freedom in this way. The Obligations operate
to deny religious freedom to Catholic health practitioners who seek to
abide by the official teachings of their Church, and they do so for no
good reason.
A number of factors indicate that the Obligations are unlikely and
unnecessary to facilitate increased access to lawful abortion services.
Firstly, since the Report was written, the Victorian Abortion Law has
been clarified and medical abortion by the use of mifepristone has
become widely available. Information about abortion providers is
widely available on the internet and elsewhere. Secondly, it appears
that a relatively small proportion of health practitioners have a
conscientious objection to abortion—perhaps ten percent and perhaps
less than five percent in the event of severe abnormality. Thirdly, the
Obligations have a disproportionate impact on Catholic health
professionals who wish to abide by the teachings of their Church. The
Obligations actively discourage conscientious objectors, and
particularly Catholics wishing to live in accordance with their faith,
from seeking to join or continuing in the medical profession in
Victoria and NSW. This not only has a detrimental effect on those
Catholic health practitioners who leave the profession, but also
deprives patients of access to the services that these health practitioners
might otherwise provide including healthcare to patients who share
their views about the value of embryonic human life. In this way, the
Obligations act to reduce—not increase—patient choice. In addition,
the Obligations, if complied with by those with conscientious
objections, may have significant deleterious effects on health
practitioners including mental distress and the loss of their moral
compass. Finally, if there remained any concern that there was any
inadequacy of the information available to women seeking to access
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abortion services, state and federal governments could supplement the
information presently available. If necessary, this could be done
without the need to compel Catholic doctors to act against their
conscience and their faith.
The need for the Obligations has not been established. The
negative impacts outweigh any potential benefits. The very limited
relevant protections of religious freedom under Australian law and the
uncertain protections afforded by international law, which may be
considered in NSW only, provide insufficient protection for the
religious freedom of a Catholic health practitioner. For all these
reasons, there is a need for urgent reform to remove the Obligations.
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